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Structure and Behaviour of Virtual Organisation Breeding
Environments
Laura Bocchi, Jose´ Fiadeiro, Noor Rajper and Stephan Reiff-Marganiec
Department of Computer Science, University of Leicester
University Road, Leicester LE1 7RH, UK
{lb148,jose,nr76,srm13}@mcs.le.ac.uk
This paper provides an outline of a formal approach that we are developing for modelling Virtual Or-
ganisations (VOs) and their Breeding Environments (VBEs). We propose different levels of represen-
tation for the functional structures and processes that VBEs and VOs involve, which are independent
of the specificities of the infrastructures (organisational and technical) that support the functioning
of VBEs. This allows us to reason about properties of tasks performed within VBEs and services
provided through VOs without committing to the way in which they are implemented.
1 Introduction
This paper reports on on-going work towards a formal approach for modelling virtual organisations
(VOs) and their breeding environments (VBEs) in the sense of [10]. A VBE defines a base long-term
cooperation agreement among a number of participants (individuals or institutions) and characterizes
their interoperable infrastructure [9]. As such, a VBE represents the organisational context in which the
creation and operation of VOs takes place; VOs are seen as ensembles that are formed dynamically to
provide high-level functionalities, or services, by sharing a number of resources in a distributed way,
using the new connectivity environments that are being made available through Global [15] and Grid
Computing [14].
The purpose of developing a formal modelling approach echoes the challenge of building “Verifiable
VOs” as raised in [7]. This implies that our approach is unavoidably partial: as in any formal account of
the real world (which includes business), we need to operate on abstractions that are amenable to some
form of mathematical representation and analysis. Our approach defines different levels of representation
of VBEs, VOs and their activities, which are essential for supporting several forms of analysis, from the
properties of the coordination structures that are put in place through policies and workflows to the
management of the resources that are shared within a VBE and used by their VOs.
There are multiple levels of abstraction at which formal methods can operate. In this paper, we ab-
stract from the specificities of the infrastructures (organisational and technical, including IT) that support
the functioning of VBEs: we aim for an ‘infrastructure-agnostic’ account of the functional structures and
processes that VBEs and VOs involve. We concentrate on the functional and behavioural aspects in
which partners and resources are involved without committing to the way in which they are effectively
implemented. Therefore, we do not model the brokers (human or software) that procure services that
can be used to create business or the communication networks that support interconnectivity — what we
could call the VBE middleware.
We are also aware that the model that we present in this paper misses several aspects of VBEs. For
instance, we do not address at present the decision-making processes through which VOs are created
within a VBE or the actual business goals that preside to the creation of a VBE (see [11] for an overview
of some of the formal approaches that have been proposed to address these issues). However, we do
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intend that the formal models that we propose can be used to inform such processes, for instance by sup-
porting stochastic analysis on the usage that VOs can make on VBE resources or validation of functional
properties that VOs offer through services, something that we are leaving for future work.
Our approach supports the definition of a structural and behavioural model of a fixed VBE based on
three different levels of representation: (1) the definition of the persistent functionalities of the VBE;
(2) the definition of the transient functionalities of the VOs that are offered by the VBE at a specific
moment in time, what we call a business configuration of the VBE; and (3) the ensemble of components
(instances) and connectors that, at that time, deliver the services offered by the VOs present in the busi-
ness configuration, what we call a state configuration. These levels are not ‘architectural layers’: they
do not contain entities that interact with entities in other layers. Rather, they represent a hierarchy of
representations at a fixed time: the first level is invariant, i.e. it provides a representation of those aspects
of a VBE that will not change; the business configuration at the level below captures the way the VBE is
logically organised at that time in terms of VOs; the state configuration represents the actual ‘physical’
instances of the VOs that are currently operational, i.e. which specific services are currently being pro-
vided within the VBE. ‘Real’ entities are only represented in state configurations: the other levels deal
only with types of entities.
More specifically, the three levels of representation are modelled as follows:
• A VBE consist of (1) a collection of resources; (2) a consortium of (persistent) partners; (3) a
number of policies constraining the way resources can be shared and the partners agree to do
business together, including rules for the consortium to expand for establishing specific VOs; and
(4) a number of supporting tasks that operate processes (management or otherwise) that serve the
roles enacted within the VBE. These constituent elements are invariant, i.e. they are present in
every business configuration of the VBE (in the sense explained below).
• The current business configuration of a VBE, is understood as (1) the collection of additional
(non-permanent) partners, that we call associates, and resources that are part of the VBE; (2) the
tasks that support the roles of the new partners and their resources; (3) the VOs that the VBE
currently supports; and (4) the policies that apply to their instantiation and their coordination at
any given time. Tasks and VOs may rely on complementary, transient partners (which we call
‘associates’) that join the VBE to provide specific business services and remain in the VBE only
while those services are required. Associates can be fixed at VO-creation time or discovered on
the fly when needed, subject to service-level agreements, in order to be able to accommodate the
needs of specific clients.
• The current state configuration of a VBE consists of ‘components’, connected through ‘wires’,
that jointly operate the tasks and the services offered by the VOs that are running in the current
state. These components include the shared resources of the VBE as well as those that are brought
into the VBE by the associates. The topology of the configuration (the way components are wired
together) reflects the policies established at the level of the current business configuration. At
this level, one can determine levels of resource consumption or properties of a number of other
parameters, including measures of quality of service.
Part of the importance of distinguishing between these three levels is that we can account for two different
kinds of change (admitting that the VBE level is invariant, the creation of which we do not model at
present):
• Changes in the business configuration reflect the creation or deletion of tasks or VOs. Creating
a new VO may involve identifying associates or the criteria that will need to be observed for
3
discovering such associates on the fly, depending on the nature of the customers that procure the
service (in which case each service may involve different associates). Deleting a VO requires
that the current state configuration is in a quiescent state relative to that VO, i.e. that none of
the services offered by the VO is currently active. Changes at this level are triggered by business
concerns (which we do not model at present).
• Changes to the state configuration result from the launching of (instances of) tasks or of services
provided by one of the VOs present in the business configuration, which dynamically adds (or
removes) components or wires to (from) the current state configuration. Changes at this level
are triggered by the actions performed by or through the components and the communications
exchanged through the wires that connect them.
Given the way levels are organised, these changes take place in different ‘timebands’ in the sense of [8],
i.e. the levels induce different granularities of time: the state-configuration changes take place within a
fixed business configuration, meaning that business configurations induce a coarser time scale.
Given the limited space available, we focus only on the VBE and business configuration levels. In the
sequel, we outline the formalisms and methodology that we are proposing for each level of representation
and change, which we have adapted (and extended) from recent work on service-oriented modelling
[12, 13]. Essentially, we use graph-based representations to formalise and establish relationships between
the two levels — logic/process-based formalisms for the specification of activities and services.
2 A Model of Virtual Organisation Breeding Environments
As already mentioned, we see a VO as a dynamic ensemble of entities that operate over a communication
and collaboration network through which they can share resources to offer services. Some of those
entities and resources are provided by the VBE in which the VO was created; others are external to the
VBE and co-opted or procured to satisfy the business goal of that particular VO. We define a (formal
model of a) VBE to consist of:
• A collection of persistent partners, where a partner consists of:
– Its name (individual or organisation, virtual or not);
– A collection of attributes through which policies can be defined on the involvement of the
partner in business configurations.
• A collection of persistent resources where a resource consists of:
– Its identifier;
– A collection of attributes through which the usage of the identified resource can be monitored.
• A collection of policies expressed over partners and resources that apply to all business configura-
tions of the VBE.
• A collection of tasks that support the roles enacted within the VBE. A task is defined by a task-
module consisting of:
– Component specifications that are used in state configurations as interfaces to the partners
(in which they are called serves-interfaces) or resources (in which they are called uses-
interfaces) involved in the task;
– Specifications of components and wires that jointly orchestrate the task.
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– Mappings from the serves-interfaces (resp. uses-interfaces) to the partners (resp. resources)
of the VBE complete the task definition.
Notice that we separate the task-module from the way it is used in the VBE. Effectively, task-modules
are design primitives that define patterns that can be reused in the definition of VBEs.
As an example, we use a very simple scenario: a group of hotels, a car rental company and a guided-
tour company decide to create a VBE — visitUs — to promote tourism in the local town.
• The partners of visitUs are the hotels (to make the example shorter, we model the case of two hotels,
grandHO and centralHO), the car rental agency carHI and the guided-tour company tourAG;
• The resources include two systems: registrationSY supporting management activities of visitUs
and a shared reservation system reservationSY supporting the business purpose (hotel bookings
and so on).
• The policies establish criteria for the admission of transient partners (e.g. they need to operate
within a given vicinity) and the use of the shared resources (e.g. the cost of maintaining the reser-
vation system), for which their interfaces need to include parameters that capture these properties.
The policies are expressed as first-order expression in the language of the parameters and the cor-
responding data types.
• The tasks include the process managerRO that supports the administrator role performed by grandHO,
which connects to the registration system, and the process memberRO that allows each partner to
use the reservation system. (Other roles might have been considered as discussed in [11].)
We use a graphical notation to depict task modules as illustrated in Figure 1 for the task managerRO
that supports the administrator of visitUs. The specification of the component MO that orchestrates the
task is Management Orchestrator and the wires are RM and MR. The specification of the serves-interface
MN used by grandHO - the partner who performs the managerial role - is Registry Manager, and the
specification of the uses-interface RE (which connects to registrationSY, the resource that supports the
task) is Registry.
Figure 1: The task module managerRO
We also use a graphical notation to depict VBEs, which is inspired by use-case diagrams (though our
usage of the notation is not necessarily faithful to its original purpose). As illustrated in Figure 2, we
use stereotypes to identify the actors that correspond to partners and resources of the VBE. Each task is
represented by a use-case.
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Figure 2: VBE diagram for visitUS
3 Business Configurations
The current business configuration of a VBE defines the types of tasks and the VOs that the VBE supports
to meet its (current) business goals. The actual process through which a VBE decides on how to configure
itself is not part of our present model as it depends on a number of business or organisational concerns
that the formal methods that we are illustrating do not address. However, the kinds of qualitative and
quantitative analysis that our approach provides should be able to inform that process and corresponding
decisions, something that we plan to address in the future.
We define a VBE business configuration to consist of an extension of the VBE with:
• A collection of associates (transient partners), where an associate consists of:
– Its name (individual or organisation, virtual or not);
– A collection of attributes through which policies can be defined on the involvement of the
associate in the VBE.
• A collection of transient resources, each of which consists of:
– Its identifier;
– A collection of attributes through which the usage of the identified resource can be monitored.
• A collection of policies expressed over associates and their resources that apply to their involve-
ment in the VBE (e.g. the conditions that determine the cessation of their involvement).
• A collection of tasks that support the roles enacted by the associates within that business configu-
ration of the VBE.
• A collection of VOs that define the services that the VBE provides in that business configuration.
A VO is defined by a VO module consisting of:
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– Component specifications that are used in state configurations as serves-interfaces to the
partners or associates, or uses-interfaces to resources involved in the VO; typically, one such
interface serves the coordinator of the VO.
– Component specifications that are used as requires-interfaces for external entities or as the
provides-interface for the customers of the VO. The specification of requires-interfaces iden-
tifies the behavioural properties that are expected of external parties to be eligible to be
chosen as service providers for the VO. The specification of the provides-interface identifies
the properties that customers can expect of the service offered by the module.
– Specifications of the components and wires that model the (possibly distributed) process that
orchestrates the services provided by the VO.
– An internal configuration policy, which identifies the triggers of the external service discov-
ery process as well as the initialization and termination conditions of the components and
wires.
– An external configuration policy, which consists of the variables and policies that determine
the quality profile to which the discovered services need to adhere.
– Mappings from the serves-interfaces (resp. uses-interfaces) to the partners or associates (resp.
resources) of the VBE complete the VO definition.
• A collection of external entities, each of which represents a partner that may need to be co-opted
to provide a service for one of the VOs that the VBE offers in that business configuration.
• A collection of customers, one for each of VO, each of which defines the interface (interactions
and functional properties) that the customer of the corresponding VO can expect.
As for tasks, VO-modules are design primitives that define patterns that can be reused in the definition of
multiple VBE business configurations. As an example, we consider a business configuration of visitUs in
which a travel booking service is offered through a VO named travelBK. An associate named travelAG is
admitted as a member of the VBE for managing that VO. Services offered through travelBK may require
an external flight agent to be discovered according to the criteria specified in flightAG. A specific agent is
not chosen as an associate in order to maximise customer satisfaction — each customer of the VO may
express service-level policies (e.g. preference for a particular airline, or minimum cost, or proximity)
that will be optimised when selecting the corresponding external partner.
We extend the diagrams used for VBEs to account for business configurations as illustrated in Figure 3.
We use a graphical notation similar to task-modules to depict VO-modules as illustrated in Figure 4
for travelBK. We use the symbol to indicate the internal configuration policy as it applies to compo-
nents and requires interfaces, and for the external configuration policy. The module consists of
a provides-interface TR for interactions with customers of the VO, a serves-interface for interactions with
the coordinator of the VO, a uses-interface for interactions with the reservations system, and a requires-
interface for the discovery of a flight agent.
A more formal definition follows where each node uniquely represents a specific interface of an
entity (e.g., institution, participant, etc.) in a business configuration rather than the entity itself. A task-
or VO-module M defines:
• A graph graph(M).
• A distinguished subset of nodes uses(M)⊆ nodes(M).
• A distinguished subset of nodes serves(M) ⊆ nodes(M) distinct from uses(M).
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Figure 3: VBE business configuration for visitUS
Figure 4: The VO module travelBK
• In the case of a VO-module, a subset of nodes requires(M) ⊆ nodes(M) distinct from uses(M) and
serves(M).
• In the case of a VO-module, a node provides(M)∈ nodes(M) distinct from requires(M), serves(M)
and uses(M).
• A labelling function labelM such that:
– labelM(n) is a component specification.
– labelM (e : n ↔ m) is a connector.
Component specifications and connectors are discussed in Section 4. In the case of a VO-module, we
denote by body(M) the (full) sub-graph of graph(M) that forgets the node provides(M), the nodes in
requires(M) and the edges that connect them to the rest of the graph. That is, body(M) consists of all the
elements that are internal to the VO.
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A business configuration of a VBE also defines a labelled graph obtained by expanding its tasks
and VOs with the bodies of the labelled graphs that correspond to their modules. Having such a formal
representation for VBE configurations allows us to use graph transformations to formalise rules and
policies to evolve the configurations, for instance the creation of new VOs. In Figure 5, we depict a
business configuration that extends the one in Figure 3 with a new VO that offers arrangements for
weddings as a service.
Figure 5: Another VBE business configuration for VisitUS
4 Component Specifications and Connectors
In order to account for the behaviour that, in state configurations (referred to as level 3 in Section 1),
emerges from the interconnections established inside the ensembles that perform tasks or deliver services
through VOs, we need a uniform representation of the entities and resources involved, which in our
approach we do in terms of component and wire specifications. A component specification is a pair
〈signature, behaviour〉 where:
• Signature declares the interactions in which the component may be involved.
• Behaviour is a formal model of the behaviour of the entity that the component represents expressed
in terms of the interactions identified in the signature and a number of parameters that reflect
resource consumption or quality-of-service attributes.
Given the space available, we are not able to define in detail the formalisms that we use in component
specifications (these are similar to those that we have proposed for the service modelling language SRML
[12]). We discuss below the provides-interface of travelBK, which is of type Customer. This specifica-
tion is what we call a business protocol: it uses patterns of typical business conversations, which are
abbreviations of sentences of a temporal logic that we have adopted for service-oriented modelling [2].
The remaining specifications can be found in the Appendix.
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In the formalism that we adopt, interactions can be either synchronous or asynchronous, one-way or
two-way (i.e. conversational):
• s&r/r&s — conversational asynchronous interaction where the initiating party expects a reply from
its co-party
• rcv/snd — one-way asynchronous receive/send
• ask/rpl — synchronization with the co-party to obtain/transmit data
• tll/prf — blocking requests to the co-party to perform an operation
In our example, the interface that travelBK offers to its customers specifies that the VO can engage in
the interaction bookTrip (initiated by the customer) and send payNotify and refund to the customer.
BUSINESS PROTOCOL Customer is
INTERACTIONS
r&s bookTrip
 from, to : airport, out, in : date
 fconf : fcode, hconf : hcode, amount : moneyvalue
snd payNotify
 status : bool
snd refund
 amount : moneyvalue
SLA VARIABLES
KD : [0..100],PERC : [0..100]
BEHAVIOUR
initiallyEnabled bookTrip ?
(bookTrip ∧bookTrip X?) ensures payNoti f y !
(payNoti f y !∧ payNoti f y.status) enables bookTrip? until today+KD < bookTrip.out
(bookTrip?∧ today+KD < bookTrip.out) ensures re f und !
re f und.amount > bookTrip.amount ∗PERC/100 after re f und !
Interactions of type r&s and s&r are conversational (in the sense of [4]), i.e. they involve a number
of events exchanged between the two parties:
interaction The event of initiating interaction.
interaction The reply-event of interaction.
interactionX The commit-event of interaction.
interaction8 The cancel-event of interaction.
interaction The revoke-event of interaction.
The meaning of these events should be self-explanatory: the reply-event is sent by the co-party,
offering a deal or declining to offer one; in the first case, the party that initiated the conversation may
either commit to the deal or cancel the interaction; after committing, the party can still revoke the deal,
triggering a compensation mechanism. Events can have several parameters (for instance, the initiation
event bookTrip carries data about airports and dates), and the corresponding reply event bookTrip
carries reservation codes for the flight and the hotel as well as the total cost).
These events are used as atomic formulae in the language that we use to specify the properties that
a customer can expect from the service. For instance, the first property specifies that the VO is ready to
receive the initiation event of BookTrip. The second property says that a commit event received during
the validity period of the booking entitles the customer to receive a pay confirmation.
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The declaration of the interactions in a signature is local to the component, i.e. all interaction names
are local. This implies that there are no implicit relationships between components that result from the
accidental of the same name: all interconnections are externalised instead in what we call ‘wires’. A
wire defines a connector through which two components can be interconnected so that they can interact.
More specifically, a connector [1, 18] is a triple 〈roleA,Glue,roleB〉 where roleA and roleB are signatures
and Glue defines the protocol that coordinates the interactions identified in roleA and roleB — this may
include routing events, superposing protocols for secure communication, or transforming sent data to the
format expected by the receiver, inter alia. A wire interconnects two components through the connector
by mapping roleA to one component and roleB to the other.
Service-level agreements are negotiated through policies using the c-semiring approach to constraint
satisfaction and optimisation [5]. An example of a policy is:
{TC.KD,TR.PERC}
def1(d,p) =
{
1 if d ∈ [0..100] and 1 ≤ d and p ≤ 90 and p≤50+5*d
0, otherwise
The policy expresses that percentage p of the cost that is refundable (transmitted to the customer
through the SLA variable TR.PERC) is bounded by the least of 90% and a linear function of the period
d during which the deal can be revoked, which is established by the VO coordinator through the variable
TC.KD.
5 Concluding Remarks and Further Work
In this paper, we have outlined a formal approach that we are defining for modelling structural and
behavioural aspects of VBEs and VOs. Several levels of representation are proposed for VBEs that
distinguish between (1) the persistent aspects of VBEs in terms of members, resources and tasks that
involve them, (2) the possible business configurations of VBEs characterised in terms of the VOs that it
creates to provide services and the additional (associate) members that are involved in the VOs, and (3)
the state configurations of VBEs, which result from the services (instants) offered by the VOs at a given
state.
From a formal point of view, these levels of representation are graphs whose nodes are component
specifications and the edges (wires) are connectors. Component specifications provide either interfaces
for partners and resources to be involved in tasks and services offered through VOs, or orchestrations of
those services, or requirements for external services, or properties offered to customers of VOs. Choosing
graphs as formal models allow us to use techniques that have been proposed for formalising architectural
aspects of system structure and evolution (e.g. [13, 17]) in order to account for the evolution of VBE
business configurations (as VOs are added, deleted or modified) and also their configuration states (as
new services are created and bound to customers).
As formalisms for specification, we are using those put forward for service-oriented modelling in the
SENSORIA project [1, 2, 12]. Together with the graph-based representation of business configurations,
these formalisms can be used for inferring emergent properties of VOs. Model-checking techniques
have been used for verifying properties offered by services [3], which we plan to extend to VOs. The
proposed formal model also supports forms of quantitative analysis using the stochastic analyser PEPA
[6, 16], which we intend to extend to VOs. Negotiation of service-level agreements is supported by
techniques for constraint optimisation [5], which again we plan to use for the discovery of services from
external partners that VOs may require.
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Appendix – The TravelBK VO-module 
 
TRAVELBK  consists of:  
• TR – the provides-interface of the module, of type Customer; 
• FA – a requires-interface (for a flight-booking service), of type FlightAgent; 
• RO – the component that orchestrates the business process, of type TravelOrchestrator; 
• RV – a uses-interface for a resource that provides a registration system, of type Reservations;  
• TC – a serves-interface for the partner that plays the role of coordinator of the VO, of type 
TravelCoordinator; 
• TO, RB, RF, RT – wire-interfaces typed by connectors that establish the required interconnections.  
 
VO TravelBK is  
COMPONENTS 
 RO: TravelOrchestrator 
   intRO init: s=START ! hconf=NILL 
   intRO term: s=END_UNBOOKED  
      " (s=CONFIRMED ! today!bookTrip.out) " s=END_COMPENSATED 
PROVIDES 
 TR: Customer 
REQUIRES 
 FA: FlightAgent 
   intFA trigger: hconf=hcode                             
SERVES 
   TC:  TravelCoordinator 
USES 
 RV:  Reservations 
13
 EXTERNAL POLICY (partial) 
 SLA VARIABLES 
     TC.KD, TR.PERC, FA.MAX, TR.KD 
 CONSTRAINTS 
  C1: {TC.getFlightCommission(FA.serviceId),FA.MAX} 
    def1(d,p)=  
 
     C2:  {TC.KD,TR.PERC} 
    def2(d,p)=  
 
WIRES (partial) 
 
TR 
Customer  c1 TO d1 
RO 
TravelOrchestrator 
s&r bookTrip 
 ! from 
  to 
  out 
  in 
     traveller 
     travcard 
 " fconf 
  hconf 
  amount 
S1 
i1 
i2 
i3 
i4 
i5 
i6 
o1 
o2 
o3 
# 
R1 
i1 
i2 
i3  
i4 
i5 
i6 
o1 
o2 
o3 
r&s bookTrip 
 ! from 
  to 
  out 
  in 
     traveller 
     travcard 
 " fconf 
  hconf 
  amount 
rcv refund 
 ! amount 
R1 
i1 #  
S1 
i1 
snd ackRefundSnd 
 ! amount 
 
RO 
TravelOrchestrator c2 
 
RF d2 
FA 
FlightAgent 
s&r bookFlight 
  !  from 
  to 
  out 
  in 
  traveller 
 " fconf 
      amount  
 
S1 
i1 
i2 
i3 
i4 
i5 
o1 
o2 
 
#  
R1 
i1 
i2 
i3 
i4 
i5 
o1 
o2 
 
r&s lockFlight 
 ! from 
  to 
  out 
  in 
  traveller 
 " fconf 
  amount  
  
  
END MODULE 
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SPECIFICATIONS 
LAYER PROTOCOL TravelCoordinator is  
 INTERACTIONS 
    rpl getFlightCommission(FAid:serviceId):moneyvalue  
 
LAYER PROTOCOL Reservations is  
 INTERACTIONS 
  rpl availability(out,in:date):hcode 
   prf book(hconf:hcode) 
   prf cancel(hconf:hcode) 
BUSINESS ROLE TravelOrchestrator is 
 INTERACTIONS 
   r&s  bookTrip 
     ! from,to:airport, 
      out,in:date, 
      traveller:usrdata 
      travcard:paydata 
     " fconf:fcode, 
      hconf:hcode, 
      amount:moneyvalue 
   ask  findHotel(out,in:date):hcode 
   tll  bookHotel(hconf:hcode)  
   tll  cancelHotel(fconf:hcode) 
   snd ackRefundSnd 
     ! amount:moneyvalue 
   s&r  bookFlight 
     ! from,to:airport, 
      out,in:date, 
      traveller:usrdata 
    " fconf:fcode 
      amount:moneyvalue       
ORCHESTRATION 
local s:[START, QUERIED, FLIGHT_OK, CONFIRMED, END_UNBOOKED, END_COMPENSATED], 
hconf:hcode 
  transition Request 
triggeredBy bookTrip! 
guardedBy s=START 
effects 
 hconf’=findHotel(bookTrip.in,bookTrip.out) 
  ! hconf’"NIL  $ s’=QUERIED 
  ! hconf’=NIL $ s’=END_UNBOOKED  
sends hconf’"NIL $ bookFlight! 
  ! bookFlight.from=bookTrip.from 
  ! bookFlight.to=bookTrip.to 
  ! bookFlight.out=bookTrip.out 
  ! bookFlight.in=bookTrip.in 
  ! bookFlight.traveller=bookTrip.traveller 
 ! hconf’=NIL $ bookTrip" ! bookTrip.Reply=False 
  transition FlightAnswer  
triggeredBy bookFlight" 
guardedBy s=QUERIED 
effects bookFlight.Reply $ s’=FLIGHT_OK 
 ! ¬bookFlight.Reply $ s’=END_UNBOOKED 
sends bookFlight.Reply $ bookTrip" ! bookTrip.Reply=True 
 ! ¬bookFlight.Reply $ bookTrip" ! bookTrip.Reply=False 
  transition TripCommit 
triggeredBy bookTrip# 
guardedBy s=FLIGHT_OK 
effects s’=CONFIRMED ! bookHotel(hconf) 
sends bookFlight# ! payNotify! 
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   transition TripCancel 
triggeredBy bookTrip$ 
guardedBy s=FLIGHT_OK 
effects s’=END_UNBOOKED ! cancelHotel(hconf) 
sends bookFlight$ 
   transition TripCompensate 
triggeredBy bookTrip% 
guardedBy s=CONFIRMED ! today<bookTrip.out 
effects s’= END_COMPENSATED ! cancelHotel(hconf) 
sends bookFlight% ! ackRefundSnd! 
  ! ackRfundSnd.amount=bookTrip.amount*PERC/100 
   transition ConfirmBookTripTimeOut 
triggeredBy now!bookTrip.UseBy   
guardedBy s=FLIGHT_OK 
effects s’=END_UNBOOKED ! cancelHotel(hconf) 
sends bookFlight$ 
BUSINESS PROTOCOL FlightAgent is  
 INTERACTIONS 
   r&s  lockFlight 
    ! from,to:airport,  
     out,in:date, 
      traveller:usrdata 
    " fconf:fcode 
       amount:moneyvalue 
  SLA VARIABLES 
  KD:[0..100],PERC:[0..100], MAX:[0..100]      
 BEHAVIOUR  
  initiallyEnabled lockFlight!?  
  lockFlight#? enables lockFlight%?  
      until today+KD ! bookTrip.out 
 
BUSINESS PROTOCOL Customer is  
 INTERACTIONS 
  s&r bookTrip 
     ! from,to:airport, 
      out,in:date 
     " fconf:fcode, 
      hconf:hcode, 
      amount:moneyvalue  
   rcv  refund 
     ! amount:moneyvalue  
  SLA VARIABLES 
   KD:[0..100], PERC:[0..100] 
  BEHAVIOUR  
  initiallyEnabled bookTrip!? 
   (bookTrip& ! bookTrip#?) enables bookTrip%? 
   until today+KD!bookTrip.out  
  (bookTrip%? ! today+KD ! bookTrip.out) ensures refund!!  
   refund.amount=bookTrip.amount*PERC/100 after refund!! 
INTERACTION PROTOCOL Straight.I(d1) is  
 ROLE A 
   snd S1 
   ! i1:d1 
  ROLE B 
   rcv R1 
   ! i1:d1 
 COORDINATION 
 S1 # R1 
 S1.i1=R1.i1 
   
                 …
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Abstract. This paper attempts to accurately model security requirements for
computational grid environments with particular focus on authentication. We
introduce the Audited Credential Delegation (ACD) architecture as a solution to
some of the virtual organisations (VO) identity management usability problems.
The approach uses two complementary models: one is state based, described in
Z notation, and the other is event-based, expressed in the Process Algebra of
Hoares Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP). The former will be used to
capture the state of the VO and to model back-end operations on it whereas the
latter will be used to model behavior, and in particular, front-end interactions
and communications. The modelling helps to clearly and precisely understand
functional and security requirements and provide a basis for verifying that the
system meets its intended requirements.
1 Introduction
The mission of Virtual Organisation (VO) is to offer a simplified end user access to
and use of high performance computing resources shared across a number of different
institutions with different administrative security domains. A typical example of a VO
is the computational grid, which aims to provide control over distributed resources con-
sisting of enormous computational power (parallel processing machines), data storage
(hard disks, memory) and visualisation on high speed networks. Examples of currently
operating grids include: the UK National Grid Service (NGS) [10] and US TeraGrid [14].
The sharing of these resources is intended to support academic research and industrial
development. A computational grid environment may consist of a mixture of several
kinds of organisations including academic, governmental, industrial and commercial in-
stitutions (will be referred to as “Sites” in this paper).
One major problem faced by end-users and administrators of VOs is to do with the
usability of the security mechanisms usually deployed in these environments [4, 1], in
particular identity management solutions. Many of the existing computational grid en-
vironments use Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and X.509 digital certificates [6] as a
corner stone for their security architectures. However, security solutions based on PKI
have to be usable to be effective. Some of the common grid identity management en-
countered include: adding and removing users, acquiring and using digital certificates.
End-users, such as scientists who are not security experts, are concerned with the results
of the computations they perform on the grid. Many of the existing grid middleware,
such as Globus and Unicore [4], require that the end-user creates a short lived certifi-
cate, known as proxy certificate, prior to running application on the grid. In addition,
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many users engage in practices which weakens the security of the grid environment,
such as the sharing of the private key of a single personal certificate because acquiring
certificates can be a lengthy process [1].
We introduce the Audited Credential Delegation (ACD) architecture as a solution to
some of the above problems and we present a formal model of this architecture. The pro-
posed solution carefully hides the use of digital certificates from end-users and enables
them to acquire credentials from their local site administrators. It also enables the latter
to to create/remove user accounts in a more efficient way. A combination of state-based
model, described in Z notation [15], and event-based model, expressed in the Process
Algebra of Hoares Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) [5] is used to model the
architecture. Z is widely used in industry for modelling complex and large systems. It
will be used to capture the state of the VO components and to model “back-end” opera-
tions on it whereas the latter will be used to model behavior, and in particular, front-end
interactions and communications. Both notations have clear and precise semantics. The
Z descriptions in this work have been type checked with ZTC tool. The modelling helps
to clearly and precisely understand functional and security requirements and provide a
basis for verifying that the system meets its intended requirements. There are several
formal frameworks that combine state-based and event-based approaches and can also
be used to have a clear and concise model of this architecture, such as Circus in [8]
and CSP‖B in [12]. Circus also combines Z and CSP. In this work we are interested
in modelling the VO architecture and the nature of Z as a pure specification language
[15], with a purer mathematical notation is therefore more appropriate than B because
it is more akin to conventional programming languages, and hence why refinement into
code is easier with these languages.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview
of the proposed VO architecture. Section 3 and 4 present formal state-based models
of the authentication components followed by a CSP description of their pattern of
interactions. Section 5 presents our conclusion.
2 Overview of Proposed Architecture
The physical infrastructure of this VO involves a separate administration site and a
dedicate gateway service, which is aimed at hiding digital certificates from end-user
environment.
The gateway is responsible for identity management and consists of the following compo-
nents: (1) Credential repository that stores certificates and their corresponding private
keys in order to communicate with the computational grid. It also maintains a list of ac-
tive proxy certificates, their corresponding privates key and an association between users
and proxies. The main role of this component is to enable local site users to authenticate
to external sites in the grid. (2) Local Authentication Service (LAS) component that
enables authenticating local site users within their organization using a locally provided
usable authentication mechanism rather than digital certificates. The LAS can support
several types of authentication mechanisms that scientists are used to such as Kerberos
[7], Shibboleth [13] or a local password database maintained at the gateway. End-users
interact only with this component of the gateway. (3) An authorization component that
controls requests issued from local site users to Grid resources. In this paper the focus
is on the local and external authentication components. The gateway will be integrated
with the Application Hosting Environment (AHE) [11], which allows scientists to run
application codes on grid resources; manage the transfer of files to and from the grid
2
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ProjectName Certificate
ResourceName Certificate
Proxy             Key
Certificate           Key
ResourceName ProjectName
Proxy             UserID
Credential Repository
DB_LAS
u1,pw1
u2,pw2
u3,pw3
u4,pw4
Local Database 
Authentication Server Authorization Module
Paramterized Role 
Based Access Control
Gateway Service
Trusted CA
Revoked CA
Role           [Tasks]
UserID [Role]
u1,pw1
Fig. 1. Audited Credential Delegation Architecture
resources; and allow the user to monitor the status of application instances that are
run on the grid resources. This way it becomes possible to identify legitimate users and
to ensure that only those legitimate users are allowed access to grid resources accord-
ing to the policy defined on the grid projet. The security components, authentication
and authorisation can be viewed as wrappers that control access to the functionality
of AHE as shown in Figure 2. A scientist can login locally using a username/password
pair for the whole session and run applications on the grid via the AHE server in a
controlled manner. We are hoping to be able to deploy this solution within AHE for use
on TeraGrid, NGS and DEISA within the next 12 months.
AHE Application
Authorization wrapper
StartJob
PrepareJob
CancelJob DownloadJob
MonitorJob
UploadJob
Authentication wrapper
Authorization 
Service
Authentication
Service
denied
result
Deny
Login
Fail
(u, pwd, task)
(u, task)
task
Fig. 2. Request by a user to perform an operation using security Wrappers
3 VO Internal Authentication
The aim of this component is to enable end-user to authenticate locally using a username-
password mechanism. To be authenticated, a user must show knowledge of a valid user-
name/password pair that matches an entry in an authentication table, which can be a
database or a password file. In this work, a simple database password is considered for
simplicity. In future work, Shibboleth and Kerberos can also be used in the architec-
ture. One of the techniques used for implementing this approach is to store the hash of
3
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a salted password rather than the password itself in clear text. This way it is possible to
know that the user knows the correct password without ever having to store the original
password on the authentication server.
DB_LAS
u1,salt1,pw1
u2,salt2,pw2
u3,salt3,pw3
u4,salt4,pw4
Local Database 
Authentication Server
RemoveUserAddUser ChangePassword
Login
ResetPassword
Logout
ProjectName Certificate
ResourceName Certificate
Proxy             Key
Certificate           Key
ResourceName ProjectName
Proxy             UserID
Credential Repository
RemoveCertAddCert AddProxy CreateProxy KillProxy
Fig. 3. Local Authentication Database and Credential Repository that stores digital Certifi-
cates, proxies and users’ credentials
3.1 State-Based Model of the Local Authentication Component
Let UserID and Data be abstract types for denoting the set of all usernames, passwords
and encrypted passwords.
[UserID ,Data]
State: The state of the local database authentication server comprises: a set of regis-
tered users; a partial function pwdDB that associates each userID with one encrypted
password; partial function that associates each user with a salt; and a partial function
encrypt that is used to encrypt/hash clear text passwords. The invariant ensures that
every registered user must have a password and that every user has an associated salt.
The model can be described in Z as follows:
DB LAS
registered users : PUserID
pwdDB : UserID 7→ Data
salting : UserID 7→ Data
encrypt : Data 7→ Data
registered users = dom pwdDB ∧ dom pwdDB = dom salting
Authentication Component Operations: The set of operations considered on this
component are shown in Figure 3. We only present the following operations on the
DB LAS : Login, ChangePassword and AddCredentialbecause of space limitation. For
more details about this model the reader is referred to [3].
The operation Login takes a username and a password as inputs and checks whether
the pair matches an entry in the database. The operation is described in the following
Z schema:
Login0
ΞDB LAS
username? : UserID pwd? : Data
encrypt(salting(username?) + pwd?) = pwdDB(username?)
4
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The operation ChangePassword replaces the old password for the specified username
with a new password after checking that the username and the old password supplied
by a user matches an entry in the database:
ChangePassword0
∆DB LAS
username? : UserID pwd? : Data newpwd? : Data newsalt?Data
encrypt(salting(username?) + pwd?) = pwdDB(username?) ∧
pwdDB ′ = pwdDB ⊕ {username? 7→ encrypt(newsalt? + newpwd?)}
salting ′ = salting ⊕ {username? 7→ newsalt?}
The AddCredential operation allows adding a new user to the database.
AddCredential0
∆DB LAS
username? : UserID pwd? : Data salt? : Data
pwdDB ′ = pwdDB ⊕ {username? 7→ encrypt(salt? + pwd?)}
salting ′ = salting ⊕ {username? 7→ salt?}
Let Report be a data type, the values of which are messages indicating whether an
operation has been successful or has failed.
Report ::= Success | Failure
Precondition of each Operation: The precondition of the operations Login and
ChangePassword is that the username and password pair match an entry in the database.
The precondition of the operation AddCredential is that the chosen username must not
be already in use. The precondition for each operation can be defined in Z as follows:
pre Login =̂ (username?, encrypt(salting(username?) + pwd?)) ∈ pwdDB
pre ChangePassword0 =̂ (username?, encrypt(salting(username?) + oldpwd?)) ∈ pwdDB
pre AddCredential0 =̂ username? /∈ dom pwdDB
Totalizing: The totalising technique is used to handle errors resulting from not meeting
the above preconditions. An error may arise because the username doesn’t exist,
UserIDNotInUse
ΞDB LAS
username? : UserID
athrep! : Report
username? /∈ dom pwdDB ∧ athrep! = Failure
or the combination of username and password is wrong:
InvalidCredential
ΞDB LAS
username? : UserID pwd? : Data
authenticationdecision! : Report
¬ (encrypt(pwd?) = pwdDB(username?)) ∧ authenticationdecision! = Failure
5
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A successful operation will result in the same report:
Op Success
authenticationdecision! : Report
authenticationdecision! = Success
The Authentication component’s operations will then be modeled as follows:
Login =̂ (Login0 ∧ Op Success) ∨ InvalidCredential
ChangePassword =̂ (ChangePassword0 ∧ Op Success) ∨ UserIDNotInUse ∨ InvalidCredential
AddCredential =̂ (AddCredential0 ∧ Op Success) ∨ UserIDInUse
Initialization: The initial state of the authentication server component is described as
follows:
DB LASInit
AuthenticationCredential ′
registered users ′ = {ali ,mark , john}
pwdDB ′ = {(ali , 6f 8cac5b994687f 7a05619c3324fbc5e),
(mark , 8d137ac4eec0df 89f 089540ac19ac99c), (john, a4375b7cc7511652d0029cbffff4269)}
In this initialization, the hashes of the passwords are generated using MD5 hash [9]. The
username/password pairs memorized by the users are: (ali , pwdx ), (mark ,mrk3000), (john,wnd1980)
3.2 Modelling the User
The model of a user focuses primarily on the security knowledge that the user must
possess and maintain for the purpose of authentication. The abstract state of a user,
User , comprises three components: (1) u names , set of usernames held by the user (also
known as principal); and (2) u password , a function that associates each principal with
a plain password. The state of a user can be formulated in Z as follows:
User
u names : PUserID
u password : UserID 7→ Data
domu password = u names
The invariant states that each username has exactly one password.
3.3 Event-Based Model of the Local Authentication Component
We derive the CSP interface of the authentication server from the Z specification. This
description has been structured as follows:
– State = DB LAS.
– Operations = {Login , ChangePassword, ResetPassword, AddCredential,RemoveCredential,Logout}.
– Preconditions of each operation:
1. Login: (username?, encrypt(salting(username?) + pwd?)) ∈ pwdDB
2. ChangePassword : (username?, encrypt(salting(username?)+oldpwd?)) ∈ pwdDB
6
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3. AddCredential : username? /∈ dom pwdDB
– Initial WS state = DB LASInit
– Totalizing the operations and adding report to handle incorrect inputs.
The interface of the authentication server is:
αDB = {Login,LoginRequest ,LoginResponse,ChangePassword ,ChangePasswordRequest ,
ChangePasswordResponse,ResetPassword ,ResetPasswordRequest ,ResetPasswordResponse,
AddCredential ,AddCredentialRequest ,AddCredentialResponse,RemoveCredential ,
RemoveCredentialRequest ,RemoveCredentialResponse,Logout ,LogoutRequest ,LogoutResponse}
The behaviour of the authentication server is modelled by the CSP process DB shown
below. The description doesn’t consider the pattern of interactions corresponding to the
operations ResetPassword , RemoveCredential and AddCredential , because this depends
on the role of the authenticated user. For example, only an authenticated user holding
an administrator role can add/remove other users and reset passwords.
DB(State) = LOGIN (state)
LOGIN (state) = Login → LoginRequest?(username?, pwd?)→
(LoginResponse!(authenticationdecision!! ; Success)
→ AUTH (u) <| pre Login(username?, pwd?) |>
LoginResponse!(authenticationdecision! ; Failure)→ DB((state)))
AUTH (u) = CHGPWD(state) 2 LOGOUT (state)
CHGPWD(state) = ChangePassword →
ChangePasswordRequest?(username?, oldpwd?,newpwd?) →
(ChangePasswordResponse!(athrep! ; Success)→
AS (state ′) <| pre ChangePassword(username?, oldpwd?,newpwd?) |>
ChangePasswordResponse!(athrep! ; Failure)→ AUTH (u))
LOGOUT (state) = Logout → LogoutRequest?(username?)→
(LogoutResponse!(athrep! ; Failure)→ AS (state ′) <| pre Logout(username?) |>
LogoutResponse!(athrep! ; Failure)→ DB(state))
So for example, a user with a valid username and password, say ali and pwdx respec-
tively, can be authenticated by the server by issuing the following sequence of interac-
tions:
CLIENT1 = DoLogin → DoLoginRequest !(username? ; ali , pwd? ; 6f ....fbc5e)
→ DoLoginResponse?authenticationdecision! → SKIP
where encrypt(pwdx ) = 6f 8cac5b994687f 7a05619c3324fbc5e.
The CSP operator [+Op+] models the interaction between two processes in which the
handshake is on the operation Op. Both processes synchronize on the channel Op. The
input values flows from the requestor to the provider and the output values flows in the
opposite direction. For instance, the result of CLIENT1 sequence of interactions with
the authentication server is calculated using a parallel composition of CLIENT1 and
AS processes as follows:
7
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CLIENT1
DoLogin
DoLoginRequest
DoLoginResponse
DB(State)
Login
LoginRequest
LoginResponse
Fig. 4. Client and Database Server models
DB(state)[+Login+]CLIENT1 = Login →
LoginRequest !(username? ; ali , pwd? ; 6f 8cac5b994687f 7a05619c3324fbc5e)
LoginResponse!(authenticationdecision! ; Success)→ DB(state ′)
CLIENT1
DB(State)
Login
LoginRequest
LoginResponse
Fig. 5. Client and Database handshake on Login Operation
4 VO External Authentication
The credential repository is used to store digital certificates or proxy certificates for
named grid projects and resources and their corresponding private keys to enable com-
munication with the grid. These certificates will be shared by a group of users and will
be used to create proxy certificates.
4.1 State-Based Model of the External Authentication Component
The model assumes the existence of the following types:
[UserID ,Subject ,Data,Key, serialNb,CipherAlgName,CertAuthorityName]
The state of the certificate repository comprises: a set of certificates; a set of project
and resources names; a partial function key association that associates each Certificate
with it’s corresponding private key; a partial function cert association that is used
to associate each project with a digital certificate; a list of issued proxies certificates
created using the digital certificates, the proxies secret keys, association between each
proxy and the user who generated it.
8
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CredentialRepository
certificates : PCertificate proxyCertificates : PCertificate
projectsNames : PName resourcesNames : PName
key association : SerialNb ↔ Key cert association : Name 7→ SerialNb
issuedproxies : SerialNb 7→ SerialNb proxyIssuer : SerialNb 7→ SerialNb
proxySecretKey : SerialNb 7→ Key userProxy : SerialNb 7→ UserID
∀ c : Certificate • c ∈ certificates ∧ c.serial ∈ dom key association ∧
ran cert association ⊆ dom key association ∧
dom cert association ⊆ projectsNames ∧
dom cert association ⊆ resourcessNames ∧
∀ c : Certificate • c ∈ proxyCertificates ∧ c.serial ∈ dom proxySecretKey ∧
dom proxySecretKey = dom proxyIssuer = domuserProxy
Where proxyCertificates is the set of all active proxies; issuedproxies, a function that
relates a serial number to a proxy certificate; proxyIssuer , a function that relates the
proxy certificate with its issuer (signer) identified by a public certificate; userProxy,
a function that associates a user in a site with the proxy certificate in a unique way;
proxySecretKey, a function that associates each proxy with its corresponding private
key. More details on modelling PKI component in Z and CSP are presented in [2].The
same approach as in the previous section can be applied to model operations. For in-
stance, the administrative operation on the CredentialRepository, AddCertificate, takes
a certificate, its corresponding private key, and the project with which it can be used
as inputs. The precondition for this operation to succeed states that the cert? should
not already be in the list of certificates . The operation is captured in Z as follows:
AddCertificate0
∆CredentialRepository
cert? : Certificate secretkey? : Key project? : Name
response! : Report
cert !.publicKey validPKIKeyPair secretKey? ∧
cert? /∈ certificates ∧ certificates ′ = certificates ∪ {cert?} ∧
key association ′ = key association ∪ {(cert?.serial , secretkey?)} ∧
cert association ′ = cert association ⊕ {project? 7→ cert?.serial}
The operation RemoveCertificate takes a certificate as an argument and removes it with
its corresponding secret key from the credential repository. The precondition states that
the cert? must exists in the certificates set.
RemoveCertificate0
∆CredentialRepository
cert? : Certificate
cert? ∈ certificates ∧ certificates ′ = certificates \ {cert?} ∧
key association ′ = {cert?.serial} −⊳ key association ∧
cert association ′ = cert association −⊲ {cert?.serial}
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a formal model of a VO architecture that combines
PKI and username-password mechanisms in order to provide a usable security solu-
tion for VO end-users. The model uses a combination of state-based and event-based
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approach. The consistency of Z model is checked with the ZTC tool. The formalism
has clarified the purpose of the VO, the explicit assumptions about sites, users, CAs
and third parties. The observation of the states enables to easily know the current ca-
pabilities of the user, site and the VO. For instance, it becomes clear from the model
of the user that he/she will have to maintain only one identity to authenticate to the
gateway. Also, it makes it possible to find a user responsible for performing a task on
the grid. This allows local sites and the entity running the gateway to monitor who ac-
cess resources for auditing and billing purposes. Most importantly, we have linked the
CSP model with the Z specification in a systematic way. We derive the CSP interface
of the VO from the Z state, operations, precondition on each operation and initial state.
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We propose a formal foundation for reasoning about access control policies within a Dynamic Coali-
tion, defining an abstraction over existing access control models and providing mechanisms for
translation of those models into information-flow domain. The abstracted information-flow domain
model, called a Common Representation, can then be used for defining a way to control the evolution
of Dynamic Coalitions with respect to information flow.
1 Introduction
A Dynamic Coalition (DC) is a group of independent organisations collaborating towards the achieve-
ment of a goal that the member organisations could not achieve alone. The dynamic character comes
from the fact that membership, and the capabilities of members, may change over time. The hetero-
geneity of the DC membership, bringing together organisations with very different policies governing
access to their services, gives rise to security concerns that would normally not be associated with a
well-defined static organisation. In order to collaborate effectively, resources need to be shared between
the participants. Many DCs emerge through ad-hoc assembly but it is nevertheless desirable to engineer
infrastructure and policies to enable aspects of the behaviour of coalitions to be verified in advance of
operation.
We treat a dynamic coalition as a group of autonomous communicating agents (the coalition mem-
bers) [4, 5]. Each member provides services that may be requested by other members and which may
entail the granting of access to resources. Each organisation that participates in a DC may be represented
as a whole as one member of the DC or as number of members. The level of abstraction in this case
depends on the desired level of atomicity of an agent. For example, in the naval context an agent may
represent the whole of a vessel or merely the vessel’s captain.
Much of the challenge in designing information flow policies and infrastructure to support a DC lies
in coping with the changing membership with the need to potentially renegotiate access and reallocate
tasks from the workflow [5].
Ideally, the dynamic properties of membership should not disrupt the operation of the coalition where
both availability and confidentiality are equally significant. These important requirements are often over-
looked and simplified (at least for dynamically reconfigurable systems) by, for example, assuming that
the operations can be suspended while the reconfiguration takes place [1, 13, 18]; in reality one cannot
suspend operations while adding new agents and assessing the impact of new agents. Furthermore, as
with most complex systems, security is often added after the design stage as a bolt-on, which is unac-
ceptable where confidentiality and dependability of information is a significant factor. The problem of
maintaining security properties of a dynamic coalition are further compounded by heterogeneity – having
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numerous agents that potentially have different and conflicting access control policies. This gives rise to
the need to be able to reason about and assess the impact of dynamic changes on coalition membership.
This paper focuses on security considerations in DC and proposes the use of a Common Representa-
tion (CR) that allows coalition designers and architects to evaluate the effects of changes in membership
of a coalition and interaction between agents. The common representation describes information flows
between agents and resources within a DC. Functions over the CR describe ways of analysing the com-
position of numerous access control policies, the impact of agents joining and departing a coalition,
coalition merging, and conflicts that may arise during a coalition’s life.
By introducing the common representation, the paper addresses the problem of managing access
controls in dynamic coalitions where there already exist access restrictions between subsets of agents
without having to design yet another access control model. Having a set of algebraic expressions also
allows coalition engineers to reason about the liveliness (ability of the coalition to complete its goals)
and the confidentiality properties of different configurations of access control restrictions.
The CR, in turn, is a foundation block of a Security Meta-Policy (SMP) which is used to guide and
control the evolution of a DC by specifying security properties that must be preserved every time there
is a change in the coalition and by describing how security-related changes must be implemented.
The paper consists of three parts. First, we first consider various access control methods in use
today (Section 2). Second, then we look at how the common representation is expressed using directed
graphs (Section 3) and show how a selection of current access control methods can be expressed in terms
of this common representation (Section 4). Finally we examine the use of the common representation to
define approaches to coalition composition (Sections 5 and 6). We end with conclusions and a discussion
of future work.
2 Access Control in Coalitions
As the information within a coalition is shared between various agents, some of whom may be com-
petitors, the ability to guard the information against misuse and to prevent this information from leaking
uncontrollably from the coalition is of paramount importance.
For the purposes of the present study we treat each DC member as a single entity. In practice,
members may themselves be composed of individuals that receive data and issue responses on behalf of
the member as a whole. We also assume that each individual tasks in the workflow being executed by
the DC may entail invocations a single service by a single agent. We therefore assume that the workflow
has been broken down to a relatively low level of granularity. We revisit these assumptions in Section 7.
The most elementary form of access control is Discretionary Access Controls (DACs). In a DAC
model, either the owner or the custodian, of information or resource has full discretion over who and at
what level (e. g. write, read) is permitted access to the resource. While this form of access control may
have its place in an organisation, the risk of information misuse and leakage is too great for DACs to be
practically used in a DC.
There already exist numerous non-discretionary access control mechanisms that are used in organi-
sations today. The non-discretionary access controls are typically predefined and are managed centrally.
The two that are most prominently used are Lattice-Based Access Controls (LBACs) [17] and Role-Based
Access Controls (RBACs) [16]. LBACs are very popular in military and other government organisations
as this model is compatible with the ‘need-to-know’ security principle whereby every participant and
piece of information is classified based on set criteria. While such an approach may be perfect for one
organisation, different organisations have different classification criteria; for example, the US and the
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UK military have different clearance levels. If LBACs were to be used in a DC, then all participants
and information would have to either be reclassified based on new common criteria or each participating
organisation would have to communicate through a trusted agent that would be responsible for ensuring
that only permitted information can leave the organisation. Both of these solutions are unacceptable,
as the first one creates a huge overhead for each new organisation wishing to join the coalition, and
the second one creates choke points which limits communication bandwidth between the agents. Addi-
tionally, non-government organisations may be unfamiliar with or not structured around LBACs, which
introduces another complication for interactions between government agencies and private companies as
the two are considered to have different priorities with respect to the information security — Clark and
Wilson argued [7] that military is concerned with confidentiality, while for private companies integrity is
more important.
RBAC is a more flexible scheme than LBAC whereby access is granted based on the role of the
participant. When the agents were to interact across organisation boundaries, new roles would have to
be created in each organisation based on the involvement of the interaction. RBACs still need to be
controlled through a centralised authorisation system, which leads to unreasonably high administration
overhead for large systems, especially when the participants may not necessarily be well-known to the
administering authority. Furthermore, without frequent reviews, in the real world, RBACs are known to
have a privilege accumulation problem, where participants retain privileges that are no longer required
and may lead to information leakage when misused.
Freudenthal et al. [10] have attempted to address some of the drawbacks of the RBACs in distributed
environments through Distributed Role-Based Access Controls (dRBAC) as part of a larger project on
Distributed Coalition Infrastructure [11]. While dRBAC is a significant step in terms of ensuring a degree
of trust and distributing the responsibility for creation of roles, this approach relies on creating new roles
for participants and is still prone to privilege accumulation.
In the context of DCs, all of the above methods of access control require conversion of agents’
policies from one to another. Performing such conversion will require a set amount of time during
which the coalition membership must remain constant; depending on the rate of change of membership,
such constraint may be unfeasible. On top of that, none of the aforementioned access control methods
address security policy compatibility across the participants of dynamic coalitions, and providing strong
guarantees that information will not traverse through organisational boundaries and end up in the wrong
hands is nearly impossible without such analysis.
There already exist security policy description languages like Ponder [9], EPAL, XACML [2] and
Hyperproperties [8]. These languages rely on the premise that the policies will be specified in a particular
description language and then translated to models or implemented in a way that the agents understand.
The approach taken in the CR is the opposite — the existing security policies are abstracted and compared
for compatibility.
While the above-mentioned access controls could work to a degree in dynamic coalitions, there is still
a great focus on who can access what, instead of managing the information flow directly. The Common
Representation that we propose in this paper is intended to translate access controls from the domain of
subjects and objects to information-flow domain and analysing the impact of such flows directly. The
information-flow domain allows us to reason how information is exchanged between agents in a coalition
and what information agents might be privy to.
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3 Common Representation
Common Representation (CR) provides a fresh approach to a policy-neutral method of defining access
control constraints for a dynamic system by focusing on the flow of information within that system.
In the context of dynamic coalitions, this represents the information exchange between agents and re-
sources. The CR also allows coalition architects to reason about and analyse the effects of permitting
new interactions between agents on confidentiality and what the impact departures of agents have on
availability of information.
The robustness of CR stems from an observation that groups of agents joining a coalition already have
an access control policy guarding the interaction between them. Thus, to provide secure communication
efficiently, merely providing a bridge between various groups of agents would suffice, deferring all access
control to run-time.
3.1 Elements of a CR
CR only concerns itself with read and write privileges as these are the only ones that cause information
to be exchanged. If any other access control modes lead to data flows, e. g. execute privilege, those, too,
can be refined down to read and write operations.
A common representation is a directed graph CR=(I,F) where interfaces, I, represent vertices and
flows, F ⊆ I× I, represent edges.
An interface is an abstract representation of a communication port. There are two types of inter-
faces: explicit and implicit. An explicit interface is an interface that represents a tuple of a resource
and an access mode, e. g. (r1,〈w〉); this type of interface an be either active (send/write) or passive
(receive/read). An implicit interface can only represent an agent and can be both active and passive. Im-
plicit interfaces are an important utility in modelling information flows where information is exchanged
without a dedicated (or perceived) resource, for example, in face-to-face communication. Any agent can
have numerous implicit interfaces. The choice of what type of interface to use largely depends on the
desired level of abstraction required by the security policy, although the decision has repercussions on
the operations as well as the ability to analyse resulting information flows.
Flows in the CR graph are used to represent permitted information exchange paths between interfaces
and are expressed as pairs of interfaces. A read from ia to ib would be expressed as (ia, ib) while a
write from ia to ib would be expressed as (ib, ia). Each flow is asymmetric and if a flow (ia, ib) exists,
there is no implication of a complementary flow (ib, ia). The flows are always expressed left-to-right,
i. e. (i f rom, ito). Any flow expressed as (ia, ib), could mean either ia
read
←−−−
f rom
ib or ib
write
−−−→
to
ia, which are
equivalent. This equivalence and asymmetry means that a CR will require two flows to represent a bi-
directional exchange of data: (ia, ib),(ib, ia). Bi-directional flows are called complementary — two flows
f and f−1 are complementary if and only if f ≡ (ia, ib)∧ f
−1 ≡ (ib, ia).
Directed representation of flows has a notable side effect — “read” and “write” lose their semantic
meaning when converted into information flows — the only way that the original nature of a particular
flow would be preserved is if at least one of the interfaces is explicit; this highlights the importance of
not relying on implicit flows.
Access, with respect to the access control policies, is an operation which leads to information being
exchanged between objects and subjects. Thus by expressing the common representation as a directional
graph of information flows we can reason about information access within the coalition.
The nature of any DC is that access can be granted or revoked on several occasions. This level of
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abstraction allows explicit interfaces to be destroyed and instantiated on-request (when an agent leaves
the coalition for example) thus fulfilling the demand for dynamic changes in access controls to a resource.
Additionally, each agent can have its own dedicated interface to each of the resources shared by other
agents. Thus when an interface is destroyed because an agent leaves, other agents can still retain access
to the same resources in the coalition.
Additionally, this representation allows any resource to have multiple interfaces, a concept which
could be used to model polyinstantiation — an explicit interface would be a third order object in the
mapping of A 7→ R 7→ I.
3.2 Granting Access
Securing the interaction between agents is based on the Clark-Wilson model [7] around a Trusted Com-
puting Base (TCB) described by Lampson et al. [14]. The Clark-Wilson model refers to the notion of
mediated access between an object and a subject: Sub ject −→ Mediator −→ Ob ject and TCB brings
about various requirements, like hardware and software support, for the mediator. The TCB refers to
the mediator as a reference monitor, which in itself is an abstract representation. The reference monitor
consists of numerous security kernels. Each security kernel is made of trusted and verified software and
hardware. As these security kernels are verified and are trusted to perform within specification, only the
security kernels are permitted to interact between agents. Therefore, removing the need to rely on correct
behaviour of any agent.
Access, by definition, is a process where information flow occurs from a to b. From this definition,
granting access from one interface to another within the CR is simply the matter of verifying whether a
particular flow is permitted.
In the absence of SMP and any other constraints, the default behaviour for a security kernel for
granting access between to interfaces can be described by a simple function grant. For brevity, in this
paper, we will assume that access will only be granted if the CR is authoritative over both interfaces,
otherwise the result of the function is undefined. For a CR to be authoritative over an interface, the
interface must be defined in the vertices of the CR graph.
grant : I× I×CR → B
grant(i1, i2,(is, fs)) , (i1, i2) ∈ fs
pre{i1, i2} ⊆ is
4 Representing Basic Policies
The previous section gave an overview of the structure of common representation. This section will
discuss how common access control policies like those described in Section 2 are mapped into common
representation.
4.1 Discretionary Access Controls
Discretionary Access Controls are typically expressed as a Capability Lists or Access Control Lists
(ACL), either of which is derived from an Access Control Matrix (ACM). An access control matrix is a
table describing permitted interactions between objects (o1,o2,o3) and subjects (s1,s2,s3). An example
ACM is shown in Table 1.
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o1 o2 o3
s1 r w rw
s2 - w r
s3 rw - r
Table 1: Simple Access Control Matrix
The access control matrix is a form of discretionary access control where the permission mapping
between subjects and objects remain fairly static and well-defined at any one time. The next two access
controls fall into a non-discretionary access controls category where instead of having a clear definition
of interactions, access is granted based on a set of predefined criteria.
For any ACM that describes access controls between a set of subjects, S, and a set of objects, O,
the DAC can be translated to a CR containing O∪ S as the set of interfaces. The flows of the CR
are based on the read- and write- operations permitted by the access controls. ACLs are expressed as
mappings from objects to a set of subjects and access modes those subjects have to a particular object:
ACL : O → P(S×M). Translating an ACL to CR once objects and subjects have been mapped to
interfaces is only a matter of determining resulting flows:
{(s,(o,〈w〉))|o ∈ O,(s,〈w〉) ∈ ACL(o)}∪{((o,〈r〉),s)|o ∈ O,(s,〈r〉) ∈ ACL(o)}
Capability Lists can be translated into common representation in a similar manner.
4.2 Lattice-Based Access Control
A Lattice-Based Access Control policy typically consists of three components: subjects, objects and
labels. Each subject and object is marked with a label, then the labels are organised into a partially
ordered dominance hierarchy (L,≤L), a special abstract function λ : S∪O→ L is then used to determine
the label associated with each object or subject.
The most commonly used LBAC policy is the Bell-LaPadula security model [3]. The underlying
principle of the model is that access is determined by the dominance relationship between the object and
the subject and that the subjects and objects are interchangeable for the purpose of modelling. The model
states that A can write to B and B can read from A if λ (A)≤L λ (B). This model reflects the equivalence
of flows in the common representation that was discussed earlier.
The derivation of the common representation for LBACs is similar that for DACs except that read-
and write- flows are treated differently. Let us assume that set I is a union of S and O. Total flows are
derived as
{(i1, i2)|i1, i2 ∈ I · i1 6= i2∧λ (i1)≤L λ (i2)}∪{(ii, i2)|i1, i2 ∈ I · i1 6= i2∧λ (i2)≤L λ (i1)}
4.3 Role-Based Access Controls
Role-Based Access Controls differ from the access controls described above in that there the relationship
between objects and subjects is not defined within the access control, instead, the subject acquires privi-
leges based on the role assignment. The implication of this phenomenon is that while it remains possible
to derive the flows of information within each role across different roles, the representation of informa-
tion exchange between subjects is deferred until the subject is assigned a particular role. Additionally,
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there is a notion of role seniority, where a senior role absorbs permissions of junior roles associated with
it.
There are two components that are involved in expressing an RBAC: role assignments and role hi-
erarchies. The role assignments consist of a mapping from a role to the privileges that role grants:
roles: R →P(O×M). The role hierarchy is represented with the role seniority relationship: RH⊆ R×R.
Due to this seniority relationship, it is necessary to determine transitive closure of each role described
by the hierarchy. This can be done using Warshall’s algorithm [19] or a similar algorithm described by
Osborn [15], which is more closely related to role hierarchies; let the transitive closure over RH be RH+.
The mapping of senior roles, seniority: R →P(R), to junior roles can then be obtained through:
seniority= {r 7→ {r j|(r,r j) ∈ RH
+}|r ∈ R}
we can then go on to invert the above mapping:
seniority′= {r 7→
⋃
{roles(r)|r j ∈ seniority(r)}|r ∈ R}
and finally, we can determine the flows that arise in the RBAC based on roles and the role hierarchy:
f lows= {{(o1,o2)|(o1,〈w〉),(o2,〈r〉) ∈ roles(r)}|r ∈ domain(seniority
′)}
5 Compositionality of CRs
Having looked at how individual access control policies can be translated into the common representa-
tion, we can now look at how these common representations can be combined together to form an overall
common representation of information flow for the whole of a dynamic coalition.
All operations on CRs assume that the names of the interfaces in all CRs, which are involved in
a particular operation, are named consistently. That is, if CR contained interface named ia and CR
contained interface named ia, then both CRs refer to the same, identical interface.
There are two composites that can be formed from a collection of common representations - the Sim-
ple Composite and the Priority Composite. Both operations have equal precedence. Thus it is important
to explicitly group expressions containing both of these composites.
5.1 Simple Composite — Merge
When two groups of agents join to form a coalition, their respective common representations need to be
merged together to form a coalition-wide representation of information flows. The most likely scenario
for a coalition formation is when the agents in separate groups are isolated from other groups in terms of
access privileges. This merge is achieved by performing a simple composite.
The simple composite is the most straightforward way of combining numerous common representa-
tions. This composite favours permit-type flows and will effectively result in a less strict policy overall
compared to any individual common representation.
merge : CR×CR →CR
merge ((ia, fa),(ib, fb)) , (ia∪ ib, fa∪ fb)
This merge operation will result in a graph of order two or higher, if the two merging CRs do not have any
interfaces in common, as a case with independent All simple composites have commutative properties
when applied as a distributed operation over a set of common representations.
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5.2 Priority Composite — Append
Numerous times during the evolution of a dynamic coalition, a group of unassociated agents will in-
evitably join an existing coalition. When a group of agents joins in, the flow restrictions defined by the
established coalition must be respected, thus any group that is merging-in will only create flows to the ad-
ditional agents. This type of merging is called a priority composite, with priority given to one common
representation. The priority composite is a way of combining common representations which favours
deny over permit. The priority composite will not allow new flows to be created for existing interfaces
where there does not exist a flow already.
append: CR×CR →CR
append((ia, fa),(ib, fb)) , (ia∪ ib, f1∪{ f | f ∈ fb · { f , f
−1}∩ f1 = /0})
The priority composite is a non-commutative operation and operates over an ordered set of common
representations with a left-to-right order.
6 Analysing CRs and Composite Properties
In this section we will look at how CRs can be analysed and look at how we might determine conflicts.
We can use a CR to determine the degree of availability of information flow paths within a DC using
simple graph theory. For example, in determining whether there is a potential for information to be
exchanged between two agents, we can check whether there exists a walk between the relevant interface
of said agents. This is an important aspect when determining whether a particular interface is critical to
the operation of the DC. We can derive the availability graph CRA of CR by replacing all complementary
flows in CR with an edge in CRA. The availability graph is an undirected graph and serves the purpose of
determining whether information can flow between the interfaces of the DC. If the number of components
in CRA is equal to one then we say that the liveliness property of a DC holds.
We will now proceed to look at conflicts in CRs. A CR conflict is said to occur when one common
representation contains a flow between any two interfaces, and the second one does not contain a flow
between the corresponding interfaces.
6.1 Identifying Conflicts
The first step to analysing any composite is to be able to identify conflicts between different common
representations.
conflicting: CR×CR → B
conflicting((ia, fa),(ib, fb)) , ∃i1, i2 ∈ (ia∩ ib) · i1 6= i2∧ (i1, i2) 6∈ ( fa∩ fb)
(6.1)
6.2 Analysing Conflicts
We can further expand on conflict resolution by zooming in on specific properties of CRs. For example,
we can identify all flows that are permitted in interfaces a but denied in b are determined by expression
in (6.2). Note that, in this case, a conflict may only arise if both CRs include identical interfaces. For
example, given two CRs
CR = ({ia, ib, ic},{(ia, ic),(ib, ic)})
34
and
CR = ({ia, ic, id},{(ia, id),(id , ic)})
the only conflict that arises is (ia, ic), as ib is not a vertex in CR and id is not a vertex in CR.
conflicts : CR×CR → F
conflicts((ia, fa),(ib, fb)) ,
{(i1, i2)|∀i1, i2 ∈ (ia∩ i2) · i1 6= i2∧ (i1, i2) 6∈ ( fa∩ fb)}
(6.2)
Similarly, flows common to both a and b can be identified from the intersection of edges of CR graphs a
and b. Finally, the flows that are different to both a and b:
diffs: CR×CR → F
diffs((_, fa),(_, fb)) , ( fa∪ fb)− ( fa∩ fb)
(6.3)
6.3 Compositionality Policies
With the aid of algebraic operations described above, coalition architects can define compositionality
policies which can then be used during the lifetime of the coalition to automate the process of assimilating
groups of agents into the coalition without having to suspend operations while policies are integrated.
Such policy may state, for example, “Conflicting policies A and B may be combined if the conflicts are
limited to complementary flows of A, otherwise, the composite policy must not create extra permissions
than those already defined by A”. This can be expressed as:
if ∀ f ∈ conflicts(A,B) · ∃ f ′ ∈ flows(A) · f ′ = f−1
then merge(A,B)
else append(A,B)
where flows is an abstract function determining information flows within a graph.
Defining policies like these is one of the purposes for the Security Meta-Policy framework which
takes the primitives of access controls and security policies and describes ways to constrain them and
perform operations on policy-neutral representations in order to expedite the integration of new agents,
impose coalition-wide constraints on policies and provide a mechanism for evaluating the effects of
policy manipulation.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we looked at a novel way of modelling security using a CR, how a CR is structured and
discussed ways of representing various access control policies in the information-flow domain. We also
have demonstrated how a CR can be used to address availability and confidentiality of the CIA security
triad. Once the policies are expressed in CR, we looked at various operations for composition and
analysis of policies.
The CR preserves the access constraints expressed in access control and security policies by design
and compositional algebra, provides a way of manipulating not only different, but also conflicting poli-
cies. While this approach is sufficient for simple problems, dealing with more advanced concepts, like
Separation of Duty or Brewer-Nash Models, requires the use of additional layer of parametrisation over
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the CR as well as the ability to define conditional evaluation operations. This layer is provided by the
Security Meta-Policy Framework which is an ongoing work. The CR is put to use in the Security Meta
Policy where the CR expression algebra is used for determining effects of changes in dynamic coalitions.
When the CR combined with a Security Meta-Policy, there exists a possibility to group interfaces by
semantic meaning together to form blocks, modifying the definition of CR to CR: (B,F) where B⊆P(I)
and F ⊆P(B×B). Each block can represent, for example, a set of interfaces that have unrestricted flow
of information between each other, or a set of interfaces where flows are forbidden, or where the number
of flows is limited between the interfaces from a block to any other block. This also allows us to model
interactions that were previously not possible in other access control methods, like groups of people.
Additionally, given that CR is essentially a graph, it should be possible to define logic for optimisation
of flows, thus reducing the number of unnecessary edges which in turn enforces the principle of least
privileges. Another way of optimising the CR would be to group various complimentary interfaces
together into individual blocks (enabled by the use of SMP). This approach would reduce the complexity
of operations but would have a side effect of limiting the ability to precisely express details of interaction.
Coming back to the assumptions made in Section 2, we can now see how the atomicity of agents
and granularity of tasks would affect the structure of the CR. However, this should not be a problem
when translating existing security policies into CR, as the desired levels of atomicity and task granularity
should already be pre-defined in the source policies. When new tasks are created, or agents added, and a
new CR is generated to include the desired changes, the new CR can be checked for conflicts against the
existing CR using techniques described in Section 6. Results of such checks can be used to gauge whether
there needs to be a further division of tasks or whether a particular flow is too permissive. This logic can
also be included into the SMP to automate the decision making process and change configuration of the
DC on-the-fly.
Finally, work on CRs could be linked with work on insider threat modelling described by Chinchani
et al [6, 12]. These models, at the most fundamental level, rely on interaction graphs between different
nodes of network to determine what node is exposed to what information. Such approach is similar
to what common representation provides, thus by moving elements of insider threat modelling into the
common representation, the risk of insider abuse could be analysed and mitigated.
Acknowledgements: We are grateful to Anirban Bhattacharyya, Jeremy Bryans, Peter Ryan and Alexan-
der Romanovsky for many helpful discussions and valuable insights.
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In this paper we present an analysis of the complexities of large group collaboration and its 
application to develop detailed requirements for collaboration schema for Autonomous Systems (AS). 
These requirements flow from our development of a framework for collaboration that provides a basis 
for designing, supporting and managing complex collaborative systems that can be applied and tested 
in various real world settings. We present the concepts of “collaborative flow” and “working as one” 
as descriptive expressions of what good collaborative teamwork can be in such scenarios. The paper 
considers the application of the framework within different scenarios and discuses the utility of the 
framework in modelling and supporting collaboration in complex organisational structures. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper addresses important conceptual issues concerning collaboration in groups and sets out a 
description of the nature of the complexities of large group collaboration. It provides a basis for 
thinking about the structural aspects of collaboration in Virtual Organisations from both a technical 
and social perspective. It describes succinctly how the findings may be applied to autonomous 
systems, based upon our past and current research on collaboration [1,2] and autonomous systems [3].  
 Why should we be interested in both group and collaborative working for complex human and 
autonomous systems (AS)? Group working is rather obvious in that many activities will require more 
resources, capability and effort that a single AS cannot provide. The second is less obvious, why 
should we be interested in collaborative working? The nature of working in teams and managing 
groups is often harder than we realize, the costs of working together can at times outstrip the benefits. 
The question is what does it mean to work together? Simply bringing a collection of people or agents 
or machines together does not achieve “working together”. The difference between a group that works 
together and one that does not shows its effects in many ways including the quality and efficiency of 
the work, the ease of working in the group, the ease of managing the group and the level of confidence 
one can have in that unit. A group which works together well achieves a high-level of “flow” to its 
work enabling a state of operation in which the individuals and the group as a whole are fully 
immersed in what they are doing by a feeling of energized focus, full involvement, and success in the 
process of the activity [3].  
To have a group (of people or AS) work together requires more than just enabling them to 
communicate and coordinate well, it requires collaboration. Collaboration requires both good 
communication and good coordination; it also requires that they work as one with shared goals, shared 
understanding, with a “common ground”[4,5]. It does not necessarily require a “leader” and can occur 
in different group structures [6]. Collaborative groups can achieve flow and produce greater quality of 
product more efficiently [7], with easier group working and with easier management. Moreover 
collaborative groups can achieve ‘flow’ and produce greater levels of creativity [8,9]. The aim of this 
paper is to understand how large groups can function as collaborative groups and how this needs to be 
adapted to be applied to particular settings, in this first instance AS. 
Achieving this aim has required us to develop a conceptual understanding of the nature of large 
group collaboration, of the ways in which it is achieved and the benefits that accrue when that 
achievement takes place. In applying this to AS requires us to identify the particular characteristics of 
large group collaboration involving autonomous systems, the problems and challenges that can arise 
whilst it is taking place and the ways in which those problems and challenges can be overcome. 
With respect to its application to deploying multiple AS the potential benefits are well documented 
[3, 10]. These benefits include the availability of a greater range of resources than are possessed by 
any single AS (e.g. the ability to search an area that includes both aerial and underwater threats), the 
enhancement of mission completion (e.g. the speed of completion, parsimony of resource utilization 
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and reliability of outcome) and the achievement of mission objectives that lie beyond the scope of any 
single system (e.g. the simultaneous screening of many thousands of people inside a crowded street or 
public space). 
To take full advantage of these benefits we must develop systems that can do more than co-exist. 
More specifically, we must design systems that can coordinate their roles, objectives, data, resources 
and activities in such a way as to achieve smooth, low cost work with minimal disruptions and 
conflicts. We describe this smooth, efficient multi-actor activity as "collaboration" and draw upon 
previous work [11] to understand its optimal operation as one involving multiple actors “working as 
one” and achieving collaborative "flow" [12]. This smooth efficient collaboration is difficult to 
achieve, even when group sizes are small (i.e. in groups of five or less, co-located actors, pursuing 
clearly defined, well-understood tasks) and the goals, actions, understandings and impact of other 
actors are easy to identify. Achieving collaborative flow in situations that require the involvement of 
larger sized and/or multiple-groups of actors is yet more difficult. Each of those actors may have 
different capabilities, pursue multiple goals and be involved in many different activities. In this 
context, the designers, managers and participants of large-group collaborations cannot rely upon the 
existence of shared or common understanding, such as that which exists within smaller groups [6,13].  
In smaller groups, each actor is often able to follow the goals, activity, tasks, resources and 
capabilities of each other actor (1:1 understanding) [5]. In large groups, by contrast this 1:1 
understanding is less prevalent (i.e. an actor may understand the goals, activities, tasks, resources and 
capabilities of some but not all other actors). In this context actors within large group collaborations 
may require strategies/mechanisms that allow them to develop and use more abstract or group-level 
understanding of each others goals, actions tasks etc [6], in addition to the more detailed 
understanding of these attributes that they may have of some subset of actors in the group. (Note: even 
in a large group there may still be some 1:1 understanding but it will not be developed between every 
actor in the group and every other actor). 
Larger-scale collaborations are, as a result, both qualitatively and quantitatively different from the 
small-group collaboration, in the sense that the possibility for a variations and individual differences in 
the goals, actions and understandings that exist within the group may not be understood easily or in 
great detail by the group or its members. Consequently, large-scale collaborations require both the 
group(s) and its (their) members to manage the understandings of and contributions to the multiple 
goals and activities. Moreover, in highly dynamic situations in which the goals, resources, group 
members etc are likely to be changeable or emergent there is even greater complexity to the 
collaboration structures and processes. 
1.1 Collaboration: the application to AS 
Our research (as part of the SEAS DTC- Systems Engineering for Autonomous Systems Defence 
Technology Centre) has identified the capabilities required of AS that enable participation in these 
large-scale collaborations, considers the costs of deploying AS without such capabilities, tests the 
benefits of deployments involving collaboratively capable AS and demonstrates the effects of such 
deployment in authentic scenarios of use. The research addresses four questions crucial for effective 
AS collaboration: 
1. What mechanisms or strategies for coping do groups of AS need to achieve/maintain 
collaboration? 
2. When AS have to collaborate with other AS within these large groups, what are the 
coping strategies/mechanisms that they require for this? 
3. What coping mechanisms/strategies do AS have to initiate a request for collaboration 
within large groups?  
4. What efforts are required by People to work with AS that either have or do not have those 
capabilities (i.e. what are the savings to the task and collaboration costs imposed upon 
those humans)? 
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1.2 Benefits of Collaborative AS 
The understanding gained by addressing these four questions has enabled the identification of the 
functionality required of next-generation autonomous systems, capable of managing their own 
contribution to wider system goals and has the potential to deliver the one human to multiple platform 
vision. This will provide for:  
• increased “Flow” in the work undertaken by large groups of AS, 
• improved coordination/reduced coordination problems within those groups, 
• fewer interruptions, 
• fewer/less severe communication problems, 
• easier and more efficient management of large groups of AS, 
• improved quality of performance and product. 
The research contributes to an understanding of the additional “coping strategies” that AS might 
adopt in response to the large numbers of actors, goals, activities, understandings and potential 
conflicts that exist within large scale collaborations and the capabilities that those AS need in order to 
implement those strategies. It also considers two factors in producing an initial requirement 
specification:– the complexity of the tasks and the complexity of the collaborations. The former 
includes the nature of the goal relationships and the latter the nature of the collaborative relationships. 
Both factors are relevant to understanding and managing collaboration in virtual organisation. In this 
paper we report the capabilities and understandings that AS will require if they are to implement these 
“coping strategies”. These strategies include mechanisms that address: 
1. Task Structure issues: The large number of and variability in the goals, activities and state-
descriptions inherent in large group collaboration must be identified, negotiated, monitored 
and judged. One possible solution is to have more abstract representations of each one that 
provide less variability (though loosing all aspects of that variability may not be desirable).    
2. Group Structure issues: The large and possible varied structure of the group(s) themselves. 
The issues of group structure and how that affects group awareness, group communication and 
group coordination. For example, one possible solution is appropriate division of the 
collaborative activity into subsections that can then be managed by addressing each 
subdivision only via a specified middle-manager or gate-keeper (of course, the consequence of 
this can be lack of awareness in the group and the gate keeper becomes the potential 
bottleneck). 
2 LARGE COLLABORATION CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS 
Previous research identified the capabilities needed to take part in small-group collaborations 
[4,5,10,11] as well as the characteristics of large-groups [3,6,15] that mean those capabilities are 
insufficient for the participation in and management of large collaborations. Previous work does not 
identify the collaborative structures and processes needed to work as one or achieve a smooth 
effortless “flow” when working in large groups. To address this, we have developed a conceptual 
framework to allow us to develop the detailed structures and processes needed for large collaborations 
in highly dynamic situations of high emergence. We present an overview of this in this paper for a 
more detailed expose see [3]. 
2.1 A Framework of Large-Group Collaboration 
In considering the collaboration requirements, we focused upon the need for a collaborative group 
to be able to manage emergent properties and dynamic changes to: 1. the organization (wider group) 
within which a collaboration takes place, 2. the internal (sub-) groups that undertake tasks within that 
collaboration, 3. the tasks themselves, and 4. the resources required to undertake those tasks. As we 
have already briefly mentioned collaboration and conflict are inseparable, in that potential and actual 
conflicting situations arise within collaborations. Hence designing collaborations without conflict is 
impossible, instead we recognise that the collaborative structure has to have conflict mechanisms.  We 
have identified three aspects of conflict: a) the avoidance of conflict before it occurs, b) the 
identification of conflict that cannot be avoided, c) the resolution of the conflict identified in b, and, in 
the execution of those three components the need for communication and coordination of the factors 
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identified above. The framework from which particular collaborative capability requirements were 
identified is summarized in Figure 1, below:  
Figure 1: Framework for large group collaborations. 
2.1.1 The Need for Small Group Collaboration Mechanisms 
The starting point for the large group collaboration framework is the vast amount of previous 
research carried out on small group collaborations (such as [4,5,10,11,13]). Rather than offer this as an 
alternative to those it should be seen as building upon them. Thus the mechanisms required for large 
group collaboration are additional to the requirements for small group collaboration moreover, small 
groups can exist within large groups as well independently from them. Consequently, both sets of 
mechanisms are needed and need to be satisfied to engage in teamwork that has “collaborative flow” 
and the ability to “work as one”. The capabilities we have identified that are required of small group 
collaboration are reported elsewhere [10,11,13] and will not be repeated here. 
2.1.2 The Need for Large Group Collaboration Mechanisms 
As stated earlier, the large numbers of actors, goals, actions and resources that make up a large 
group collaboration place additional requirements for collaboration mechanisms to enable the 
achievement of collaborative flow in the context of the highly dynamic and emergent aspects of the 
required teamwork. Figure 2. Below situates the problem space for large groups collaboration (adapted 
from [17]). Our focus is in P4, where there are problems of broad extent coupling diverse complex 
subsystems.  In P1, where we have problems of limited scope and limited complexity, simple 
coordination mechanisms will suffice. In P2, where we have problems of a limited extent but with 
high complexity, mechanisms for self-coordinating groups will suffice.  In P3, where we find 
problems of low complexity but high extent and diversity, structured collaboration mechanism are 
needed and will suffice.   
 
Organisation 
Task structure 
Group structure 
Resources 
Coordination 
Communication 
Avoid Conflict 
Identify Conflict 
Resolve Conflict 
External change 
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 Figure 2. The problem space for large group collaborations. 
Hence, those involved in large collaborations will need further capabilities and mechanisms in 
addition to those identified for small group collaboration. More specifically for example, they will 
require capabilities that will allow them to dynamically re-distribute resources, dynamically share 
goals within groups of actors etc where the extent and diversity of these are too large to allow 1:1 
monitoring of each other’s action, sub-goal and outcome. Hence in large group collaborations the 
importance of further mechanisms and capability to address P4. in figure 2. 
2.2 The Framework 
The Framework presented in Figure 1. describes a number of structures and process relationships 
that come into play and influence large-group collaborations.  There are a number of structures (on the 
left-hand side of the framework and coloured green) covering task, organisation, group and resources, 
where within each there are many alternative structural relationships. For example, there are many 
different types of task structures and, and within a given task structure there will be different types of 
relationships between the elements of the task. For example, within a task structure there may be 
hierarchical goal structuring and a network structure for the various procedures used. Similarly, there 
are many different types of organisation structures and within a given organisational structure there are 
different types of relations. Hence each of the task, organisation, group and resource, structure cells of 
the framework represent components that are themselves complex. Moreover, they are dynamically 
changed by both internal and external factors and interact with each other. Hence the different task 
group, organisation and resource structures interact with each other to deliver a collaborative 
mechanism. For further details of the various task, group, organisation and resource structures see [3]. 
The central cells of the framework  (coloured orange in figure 1) capture the different coordination and 
communication structures and processes that may exist within a large-group collaboration.  The 
coordination structures and processes operate across and within each task, group organisation and 
resource structures. For example processes and structures for coordinating resources relative to their 
use in tasks by groups between organisations are detailed here. Similarly, communication structures 
and processes operate to ensure that appropriate information, understanding and awareness is achieved 
both about and across the tasks, organisations groups and resources. Moreover, particular 
communication structures and processes may take different forms across the collaboration. For 
example the communication processes within one sub-group may be strictly hierarchical, while in 
another it may be possible for anyone to communicate with anyone and everyone directly.  (As above, 
for further detail see [3]). The right hand-side of the framework (coloured pink in figure 1.) addresses 
the processes and structures that are required in a collaboration to avoid, identify and resolve conflict. 
This is explicit in the framework because of the importance of conflict to collaboration.  The three 
cells collectively capture the processes and structures managing and offsetting conflict as it arises and 
before it arises that enable resource conflicts, task conflicts, group conflicts, and organisational 
conflicts to be overcome. Moreover, the relationships between the cells on the green (left-hand side) 
and the pink cells (right-hand side) of figure 1. are “piped” through the coordination and 
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communication processes and structures. Hence, the subject matter of the coordination and 
communication processes relate to the resolution, identification and avoidance of conflict relating to 
task, group, organisational and resource properties. The need for these may arise as a result of external 
factors forcing change or from internal factors requiring adaption and change in one part resulting 
from change in another part of the collaborative system. For the purposes of this paper we describe the 
whole system driven from the perspective of the right-hand (Conflict) side of figure 1, however we 
could equally well describe the system starting from the left-hand (task, group, organisation, resource) 
side.     
2.3 Avoid Conflict 
Conflict is an integral part of collaboration [14]; it is the management and reduction of conflict that 
leads to successful collaborations. Hence to understand collaboration one must consider conflict 
avoidance, identification and resolution. The first area described is the avoidance of conflict between 
the members of a large group and their understandings of the ways in which the task at hand would be 
achieved. Furthermore we also consider the roles, goals and actions to be adopted during the 
achievement of the task and the allocation of available resources in the course of that adoption. This 
section describes that first part of the framework. 
2.3.1 Task Structures – Goals 
There are many different models of task structuring (indeed we have ourselves contributed to these, 
see for example, [16]) however, while they may use different terms and have different intended uses 
they share a number of properties in common. Of concern here is the properties of collaboration 
structures and process required to achieve tasks, rather than the modelling or analysis of tasks 
themselves.  
The collaborating group must distribute the group’s work amongst its various actors and sub-
groups. This distribution requires a set of capabilities of group members if it is to be achieved without 
external intervention. Those capabilities include the identification of local goals that will, when 
correctly scheduled and completed, lead to the achievement of the group’s, high-level goals, the 
mapping of those sub-goals to the achievement of high-level goals (i.e. an understanding of the 
relationship between the achievement of local goals within smaller sub-groups and the progress of the 
wider group towards its shared, higher level goals), the allocation of those sub-goals to appropriate 
actors and/or sub-groups and, where appropriate, the re-negotiation of that allocation with those actors 
and sub-groups. 
2.3.2 Task Structure - Actions 
The actors and sub-groups must have and/or negotiate an understanding of the actions needed to 
achieve their local sub-goals. In some situations, this negotiation will require only an agreement that 
sub-goals will be achieved, in others that they will be achieved to a specified schedule (in line with the 
dependencies that exist between sub-groups and their local objectives). In other situations, the trust 
held by managers and leaders of the group will be so low that individual sub-groups maybe required to 
provide a detailed description of the way that sub-goals will be achieved, rather than being left to 
make their own way towards their own objectives, and hence gives rise to the need for further 
communication and coordination in the collaboration.  
2.3.3 Organisational Structure  
The organisational structure refers to the pattern of relationships that exist both within a group(s) 
and in the organisation(s) in which the group(s) exists. For example a hierarchical group may exist 
within a coalition of services (as we find when military allies are created or when different care 
services work together). In homogeneous groups (i.e. groups with a single structure and in which each 
participant has an identical understanding of the group structure), certain conflicts would not arise i.e. 
the structure of the group would, by definition, be known by all group members. With heterogeneous 
groups participants would need to avoid conflict between competing understandings of the group 
structure to be adopted (e.g. what roles were needed and their definition, the process of allocating 
roles, the responsibilities of those roles etc). Participation in either “homogenous” and 
“heterogeneous” groups would require a number of key properties (i.e. collaboration requirements) to 
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address external and internally driven dynamic changes: Structuring (and restructuring) of the group 
for appropriate resources (and resource changes), structuring (and restructuring) of the group to enable 
effective co-ordination and communications, structuring (and restructuring) to enable task (and 
changes to task) goals, structuring (and restructuring) of group  to meet external organisational needs 
(and organisation changes), - in all cases to avoid/mitigate conflicts arising in the collaboration. 
2.3.4 Group Structure - Roles 
Both hetero- and homogenous groups must agree the specific roles to be played by individual 
actors in the course of a collaborative activity. In a flat structure (i.e. one, in which each actor is able 
to interact with and influence the work of each other actor), these collaborative roles will differ very 
little from each other (i.e. the information, requests and responses passed from one actor to another 
will follow similar patterns, though the specific part of the collaborative task undertaken may vary 
from actor to actor). 
In more structured groups, some actors will be asked to perform management roles (i.e. to direct 
the activity of other actors and / or to channel the information between the wider group and their 
“subordinates”), some will be asked to subordinate themselves to such managers and some to adopt 
both management and subordinate roles (i.e. to become “middle-managers”). The specific roles 
adopted within a particular collaboration will influence and be influenced by both the capabilities of 
the actors participating in a particular collaborative group and on the organizational structure of that 
group. Some groups of actors may, for example collaborate without the need for a central manager, 
some groups may have one or more managers imposed upon them by a higher authority and some may 
select managers by following a pre-determined algorithm such as voting amongst themselves.  
If correctly managed, the structuring of a large group through such an allocation of roles will allow 
large groups to cope with the impossibility of monitoring every actor, action and objective, whilst 
ensuring that the group goals are achieved, available resources are utilized appropriately, collaborative 
flow is maintained and the group can adapt to dynamic changes such as the loss of an individual actor 
the loss of a resource or the alteration of a high level goal by an external authority.  
2.3.5 Group Structure - Actors 
In either context, (i.e., homogeneous or heterogeneous organisational structures), the actors 
responsible for assembling a large, collaborative group of their peers would need to be able to identify 
the resources and capabilities needed for the completion of the task at hand (e.g. if the task involves 
the construction of a wall the need for a certain number of bricks, a quantity of mortar and abilities to 
both lay bricks and mix mortar). In more sophisticated cases, this capability may extend to the 
identification of different combinations of resources and capabilities, any one of which could be used 
to satisfy the requirements of the task (e.g. in the case of the wall-building example, either the bricks, 
mortar and construction capabilities, or an ability to transport an pre-fabricated wall from a storage 
location to the construction site). In such cases, the capability requirements demanded of any actor 
involved in group-assembly would then include the identification of appropriate resource/capability 
combinations, the mapping of specific combinations into collaborative task completion outcomes plus 
the identification of resources and capabilities available by potential group members. 
2.3.6 Resources 
The resources needed for the completion of tasks may be drawn from either local or global sources. 
In some cases, specific actors or sub-groups will hold resources. For example, an information resource 
may be available only to the sub-group, organisation, or location in which it is held. In other cases 
central resource stores may be appropriate – information may be made available to all members of the 
collaborative group, regardless of their small (sub) group membership. Similarly, a single fuel dump 
may be managed by a single sub-group and allocated to other group members in case of need. 
2.4 Identify Conflict 
Despite the best attempts of the participants involved in a specific collaboration dynamic changes 
(e.g. in group composition, group structure, overall or local goals, prevailing activity and available 
resources) will inevitably present the opportunity for unanticipated conflicts to arise. In order to 
resolve these unanticipated conflicts, actors will need to both maintain awareness of those different 
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factors (from group composition to resource availability) and, as the next section makes clear, manage 
or resolve conflicts arising within and between them.  
2.4.1 Maintain Awareness.  
In collaborating groups members must maintain awareness of the complex components of the 
prevailing collaboration if they are to first identify and subsequently address the potential for conflict. 
Organisational and Group Structure & Processes They must, for example, maintain awareness of 
the organisational structure or structures that govern the prevailing collaboration. For example, in 
homogenous groups of AS that awareness can be relatively easily maintained, since each of the AS 
involved will, by definition have an identical understanding of group structure (i.e. they will all have 
an identical understanding of the hierarchical, holarchical or other group structure under which the 
group is operating). It should be noted that such common understanding cannot be assumed in 
heterogeneous groups. 
 Even within homogeneous groups actors involved in large group collaborations must maintain 
some awareness of the composition of the group within which they are working. This does not mean 
that they must maintain understanding of every individual actor and group within the wider 
collaboration in which they are involved. They must be able to identify local managers, subordinates 
and contacts, must understand how communication can be achieved with each one and must also be 
aware of changes in role allocation that causes a new actors to be their manager, subordinate or 
contact: 
Task Structure & Processes In any dynamic environment, a truly collaborative actor must also 
maintain awareness of the group’s goals and sub-goals. Once again, no comprehensive awareness of 
all such goals either can or must be maintained by a single actor. This limitation notwithstanding each 
actor in a large-group collaboration must maintain awareness of their own objectives and, depending 
on their role, those of managers, subordinates and/or contacts in other sub-groups. This understanding 
is important if actors are to coordinate their activity with others and, ultimately ensure that this activity 
contributes to the groups shared goals. 
Each actor must also maintain awareness of their own actions and their effects on the goals of the 
other group members with which they are in contact (the managers, subordinates and contacts 
identified above). In large group collaborations, the wider effects of each action may not be 
understood by every member of the wider group but an effective group structure will ensure that an 
appropriate understanding will be available to those in key roles and, as a consequence, that 
collaborative flow is maintained as the group progresses towards its shared goals. 
Resources. Finally, actors must maintain awareness of the resources that they need to complete 
their activities. They must follow the extent to which they hold sufficient reserves of each resource 
(e.g. knowledge, fuel or payload) themselves, the amount of each resource that can be obtained within 
the sub-group to which they belong and, in case of need, the nature and amount of the resources that 
can be obtained from a central store.  
2.4.2 Manage Dynamic Changes 
To exemplify the interactions and interconnectedness of the different components of the framework 
we consider how when a change occurs to one part it influences and affects everything else in the 
framework. 
Though maintaining awareness of a group’s initial configuration and of the changes to that 
collaboration are central to an actors participation in collaborative work, it should be noted that this 
awareness is not, in itself, sufficient for collaborative flow to be maintained in many collaborations. In 
addition to understanding a developing large-group collaboration, actor(s) must also be able to adapt 
to (manage) dynamic changes within that collaboration. They must, for example, be able to manage 
changes to the composition of the group i.e. to deal with situations in which loss of functionality, 
changing priorities or instruction from a higher authority cause actor to either join or leave a group 
involved in collaborative activity. 
In the homogenous, structured, large groups those joiners and leavers may have no immediate 
impact upon a particular actor (because the joining or leaving actor affects only a remote subgroup), 
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may change the composition and therefore activity of the local sub-group or may lead to the 
replacement of an actors immediate superior, subordinate or contact within other sub-groups.  
This in turn may lead to dynamic changes to the task structure and processes in the light of a new 
role being adopted by the actor. Those changes to group composition (or indeed other changes e.g. the 
loss of an important resource, a change in the environment within which the group is acting or fresh 
instructions from a remote authority) may in turn cause dynamic changes to local goals, high-level 
goals or both.  
In response to changes in group goals or composition, the actions of an individual actor may also 
need to be dynamically altered. The adoption of a new group structure, role or local (sub) goal will 
each cause a collaborative actor to reconsider their activity, the schedule to which that activity must 
adhere or both together. 
Finally, the resources needed by and available to an actor working within a large group are likely 
to change in the course of collaborative activity of any complexity. A lost communication channel can 
lead to the loss of information resources (i.e. those resources which were supplied by other actors), a 
blocked physical pathway may lead to lost fuel supplies and the loss of a superior or contact actors 
will prevent communication beyond the immediate sub-group within which an actor is operating. 
Adaptation to such losses may only be possible if actors posses the capabilities to: a) dynamically 
change goals, group structure and activity in light of changes to resource needs and b) dynamically 
change goals, group structure and activity in light of changes to resource availability. 
2.5 Address & Resolve Conflict 
When conflicts are identified in the course of a large-scale collaboration actors will also need the 
capability to address and resolve them. In perhaps the least disruptive case, the actor(s) identifying a 
conflict may also be able to resolve it. This may require the revision or change of individual tasks 
(which in-turn may impact upon the wider task of the group). It may also require an alternative or 
additional resource usage (e.g. the allocation of more time to a transport task in exchange for a lower 
fuel usage). To the extent that these changes are made they must be done so with communication and 
coordination to the appropriate other members of the collaboration to ensure that awareness and the 
potential for further conflict is minimised. Hence we see a further instance of the complex interactions 
that occur with the collaboration framework 
2.6 Communication and Coordination Structures and Processes 
In describing the framework here we have left largely implicit the detail of the communication and 
coordination structures and processes needed. Briefly, the coordination structures and processes 
characterise the dependencies and the means for ensuring the required states between those 
dependencies are maintained. These exist both in the individual cells of the framework and between 
the cells of the framework. For example within the task structures there will be coordination processes 
needed to ensure that the completion of tasks are coordinated within the group. Furthermore, between 
the resource and task structures there will be coordination process to ensure the availability of 
resources in timely manner.  
Similarly, the communication processes and structures are the rules governing the routes and the 
form of communication within the collaboration. These may be universal (i.e. one set of rules applies 
to all) or may be diverse (i.e. different rules apply to different parts) and static or dynamic (i.e. they 
may be allowed to change over-time and/or events or not). These communication rules will again have 
implications and influences upon the group, task, organisation and resource structures and upon how 
conflict is avoided, identified and resolved in collaboration. (For a fuller description see [3]). 
3 APPLICATION TO AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS AND BEYOND 
We have briefly described the collaboration framework from the perspective of the “Identify 
conflict”, “Avoid conflict” and “Resolve Conflict” sections of Figure 1 and considered some of the 
capabilities that collaborative groups of people and/or autonomous systems will need. Future work 
will develop simulations of autonomous systems that implement those capabilities and will then use 
those simulations as the basis for testing the validity and practicality of those candidate requirements. 
The research will also apply the collaboration framework to heterogeneous groups of AS to consider: 
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o different communication pathways between AS in different parts of the wider 
collaboration, 
o different understandings of the division of labor between different parts of the group, 
o different allocations of resource both to individual AS and the sub-groups to which they 
belong, 
o different coping strategies in the case that conflicts arise, such as those described above. 
3.1 Further Issues 
In applying the framework to AS we recognise there maybe collaboration problems arising that 
cannot be resolved by the AS encountering the problem. This may occur because AS have not been 
designed to play a full collaborative part in an activity. Alternatively, AS may incur damage, resources 
run out and group members lose contact with the wider group. In both cases this may affect individual 
and group ability to; 
o avoid group structure, group composition, role, goal, activity and resource conflicts, 
o identify group structure, group composition, role, goal, activity and resource conflicts and 
o resolve group structure, group composition, role, goal, activity and resource conflicts. 
Moreover, this may lead to a situation: 
o where a partial or complete inability to avoid conflicts will result in an increased need to 
identify and resolve conflicts, and 
o a partial or complete inability to identify conflicts will obscure any remaining capability 
an AS holds to resolve those same conflicts. 
In such situations, we may use the framework to identify a fallback solutions or “work-around” that 
can be used to improve large group AS functionality (where a full collaborative capability is not 
available), and to identify the collaboration costs and limitations associated with each work-around. 
3.2 Relevance to Virtual Organisations 
The framework we have presented here is of a conceptual nature, largely of relevance to those 
interested in understanding and/or developing collaborative organisations. It provides a basis for 
developing detailed models of the interactions that go on in collaboration and for modelling the 
structures and processes in a collaborative organisation. An important area is the development of 
mechanisms and technologies to support such collaborative organisations that can (and must) be 
developed following this framework. Research we are engaged in beyond our AS work includes work 
with health organisations and with local authorities where we are helping them to engage in 
collaborative decision-making, and collaborative service provision. In many cases these collaborations 
are creating new virtual organisations (VO) that come together to deliver and develop services, and 
which involve people from many different individual organisations and groups. To support these 
applications we need to develop mechanisms and technologies that address: 1. the development of a 
VO, 2. the functioning of a VO, and 3. the assessment of the collaboration in a VO. We envisage the 
development of collaborative VOs using the framework to also require tools and languages to allow 
the proposed structures to be expressed and reasoned about as an aid to design. To support the 
functioning of the VO we envisage that environments and tools that support easy and efficient sharing 
of information, formation of policy, decision-making and communication and coordination will be 
needed. While to support assessment of collaboration we will need to develop metrics of such aspects 
as the amount of communication or ease of communication, the amount of consensus, and sharing that 
exists within the organisation and the ability to avoid, identify and resolve conflict. All of these require 
language and software technologies that can carry with them a change of culture that allows 
organisations to work collaboratively to meet the demands of complex dynamic situations.   
4 CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, therefore, this paper extends our understanding of collaborative structures and 
processes. It situates large group collaboration within the broader context of social emergence [15]. It 
has led to a set of requirements for future generations of autonomous systems capable of participating 
in collaborative activity. We also identify areas in which future research must extend the work 
presented here. More specifically, those extensions must include: 
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o Investigation of AS reaction to ‘individually-unsolvable’ role, goal, action and resource 
conflict, 
o Testing of both the validity and utility of the requirements identified here, 
o Application to human collaborations in service delivery. 
o Development of technologies to support dynamic collaboration in large-scale groups. 
These extensions are the subject of our further research.  
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We propose a formal agent-based model for VOs in grid/service-oriented architectures, and an oper-
ational model for the creation of VOs. The models abstract away from any realisation choice and can
be deployed within different agent systems. Within the proposed models, VOs are seen as emerging
from societies of agents, where agents are abstractly characterised by goals and roles they can play
within VOs. In turn, VOs are abstractly characterised by the agents participating in them with spe-
cific roles, as well as the workflow of services and corresponding contracts suitable for achieving the
goals of the participating agents. We illustrate the proposed models in an earth observation scenario.
1 Introduction
The basic definition of Virtual Organisation (VO) is simple enough: organisations and individuals who
bind themselves dynamically to one another in order to share resources within temporary alliances [9].
Several issues at various levels of abstraction arise when attempting this binding and sharing. We fo-
cus on an abstract, high-level description of VOs and their lifecycle and define a formal model for VOs
and their formation that can guide their realisation. Like others (e.g. [4, 7, 10]) we focus on VOs that
can be formed and managed automatically by intelligent agents. These agents “represent” organisations
and individuals providing and requesting resources/services, by “wrapping” them or by connecting to
their published interface. Agents are designed to incorporate the requirements of these organisations and
individuals and exhibit some “human aspects” while supporting the decision-making processes automat-
ically. Differently from others, we abstract away from concrete realisation choices so that our models
can be deployed within different systems. Also, our models focus on what we believe are the essential
elements of VOs, and ignore a number of lower-level aspects, e.g. as defined in the ARCON reference
model for collaborative networks [6].
Our representation of the VO lifecycle reflects the orthodox managerial and technical views of VOs,
as proposed by [2, 8, 13]. This lifecycle can be structured in three main phases: and the selection
of partners, formation, operation, and dissolution. In this paper we focus on the formation phase with
subphases: (i) initiation, whereby an initiating agent identifies the goals that it cannot achieve in isolation
and discovers the potential partners who can assist it in achieving those goals; and (ii) configuration,
involving some form of negotiation, trivial or otherwise, and the selection of partners, trimmed down
from those discovered, who will constitute the members of the VO once it is started. We see a VO
abstractly as a tuple consisting of agents participating in the VO, roles they play therein, goals the VO
is set to achieve, the workflow of services being provided within the VO, and contracts associated with
these services, to which agents are meant to conform. We then define the formation phase of a VO as a
transition system between tuples providing partial approximations of the resulting VO. Within our model,
for the purposes of VOs, agents are seen as existing within agent societies: we define these abstractly
as our starting point. VOs then emerge within societies as a result of interactions amongst agents, as
determined by the roles they play.
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2 VOs as Agent Societies
Throughout, we illustrate the proposed models for VOs by showing how they cater for the following
simple but realistic scenario. A government ministry requires the detection of an offshore oil spill. This
high-level goal cannot be immediately satisfied by the ministry itself. Instead, the ministry contacts
(some of) the companies that control satellites which may provide suitable images. Different satellites
have different orbits, sensors, capabilities and costs and some satellites may be more appropriate than
others in different circumstances. Satellites may include Envisat, ERS-1, RADARSAT. The raw images
from any chosen satellites are not immediately suitable and need to be processed by appropriate software,
for example for format conversion (into formats such as TIFF, JPEG, etc), reprojection (into different
coordinate systems), pattern recognition (to detect ships, buildings, oil spills etc). In our scenario, the
ministries would require a pattern recognition post-processing for oil spills. This process results into a
VO consists of three parties: the government ministry, playing the role of service requester; the satellite
company and the post-processing company, playing the role of service providers. The two requested
services are orchestrated into a workflow by the ministry, where the post-processing of the image data
requires that the image data is created first. To guarantee the properties and delivery of the services
provided by the satellite company and the post-processing company and to ensure those companies are
compensated for their efforts, all the parties involved sign a contract, which binds parties, in particular
establishing their roles within the VO and defining a Service Level Agreement (SLA). In our scenario, a
SLA may specify the resolution of images, quality threshold, and time of delivery.
The paper is organised as follows. The formation phase for VOs, defined as a state transition system,
will be formalised in section 3. But first, in section 2, we formalise the (abstractions of) agents, their roles
and social norms (specified as interaction protocols) in an agent society, services/resources, workflows
combining them and contracts. These components will become the constituents of the VOs as they are
produced. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2 Agent Societies
For the purposes of VOs, agents “representing” services can be seen as existing within a society (of
agents). VOs emerge as a result of interactions amongst the agents in this society. In other words, the
agent society can be seen as the breeding environment [5] for VOs. We will assume that an agent society
exists prior to decisions and interactions leading to VOs. However, typically this society is intended to be
“virtual”, in that it is the implicit result of the existence of agents and services within an agent-enabled
grid/service-oriented architecture.
An agent society is characterised by roles that agents can adopt, services available to and controlled
by agents in the society, possible combinations of these services within workflows, and possible contracts
between agents. Formally, AgentSociety = 〈Agents,Services,Roles,Work f lows,Contracts〉 where
• Agents is a (finite) set of agents, {A1, . . . ,An}, with n ≥ 2; each agent is equipped with a set of
individual goals, an evaluation mechanism, and a set of roles it can cover (see section 2.3)
• Services is a (non-empty and finite) set of services represented by agents (see section 2.1)
• Roles is a (non-empty and finite) set of roles that agents can play within the society as well as the
VOs, once they have been created; we require that there are roles for requester(s) and provider(s)
in Roles, for all s ∈ Services; roles are associated with interaction protocols (see section 2.2)
• Work f lows is a (non-empty) set of possible combinations of services in Services (see section 2.4)
• Contracts is a (non-empty) set of possible combinations of agents (in Agents), roles (in Roles),
and workflows (in Work f lows) as terms in a contract (see section 2.5)
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Note that, in addition to roles for requester and provider of all available services in the society, Roles
may also include roles for consultant, to provide information on how to obtain or use some services,
arbitrator for some service, etc. Finally, note that there are no goals of the agent society itself, and goals
exist within agents only. However, VOs are goal-oriented: we will see, in section 3, that the goals of
VOs originate from those of individual agents.
The components of an agent society will be defined using several abstract underlying languages.
Here we single out these languages. We adopt the following conventions: variables start with capital
letters; constants start with lower-case letters or numbers; ‘ ’ stands for the anonymous variable.
We use a set AIas of agent identifiers, that serve as unique “names” to address agents in the society,
e.g. to support communication. An example is satERS1Ag, representing the satellite ERS-1.
We use a set RIas of role labels for the definition of Roles. We require that requester(s) and
provider(s) belong to RIas, for all s ∈ Services.
We use contracts identifiers, CIas, univocally identifying and distinguishing contracts in Contracts.
We will assume some given, shared ontology Oas, that, for the purposes of this paper, for sim-
plicity we think of as a set of atomic and ground propositions.1 Oas will include (i) (an abstract rep-
resentation of) all services in Services, (ii) generic infrastructure knowledge, e.g. for querying reg-
istries holding information about agents and the services they provide. An example of the latter may
be provides(X ,satImage(in,out)) instantiating X to satERS1Ag, representing that the agent named
satERS1Ag represents a provider of service satImage(in,out) ∈ Services.
We will see that VOs emerge in an agent society by inter-agent communication-based interaction. As
conventional, it is important that communicating agents share a communication language, that constitutes
a “lingua franca” amongst the agents. We thus assume as given a language ACLas of locutions. As
conventional, locutions consist of a performative and a content. Examples of locutions in ACLas may be
request(s) and accept(s), where s ∈ Services is the content,
Each individual agent is equipped with an internal language to express its knowledge/beliefs and
goals. Since the goals of VOs are derived from the individual agents’ goals, we need to assume that the
agents share at least a fragment of their internal languages. This fragment can be also used to express,
e.g., conditions in protocol clauses (see section 2.2). We will refer to this shared fragment of all agents’
internal languages as Las. We require that the sentence true is contained in this language, as well as
sentences built using the usual connectives ∧ and ¬. We assume that this language is propositional.
Examples of sentences in Las may be toBuy(satImage(in,out)). Sentences are meant to be evaluated
using the agents’ internal evaluation mechanisms (see section 2.3).
Note that there are no eligibility conditions to choose which agents enter the society, as we assume
an open setting where agents can freely circulate. In this context, VOs provide a mechanism for defining
which agents can be suitably put together to help solving each others’ goals.
2.1 Services
Concrete services, that can be executed by their providers, are described using sentences in Oas. Exam-
ples of concrete services are satImage(in,out) with in and out representing the inputs and outputs for
the service (e.g. in may be [38.0,−9.4,1000,500,5,optical,3] and out may be results.data2 and some
1 In general, Oas may need to contain hierarchical concepts, for example a “generic service” may be defined as either a
“satellite service” or a “processing service”.
2Here, 38.0 and -9.4 are the latitude and longitute coordinates of the area to be scanned, 1000 is the resolution of the image
in metres, 500 is the km2 area to be scanned, 5 is the frequency in hours for the area to be scanned, optical is the type of sensor
to be used, 3 is the wave frequency to be used in the scan, results.data is the name of the file produced by Envisat.
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service for detecting oil-spills detectOilSpills([a,5],b)3.
In order to accommodate negotiation for the provision of (concrete) services, during the formation of
VOs, it is useful that agents are able to talk about partially uninstantiated and abstract services, before
they commit to any concrete instantiation (actually, it may happen that this instantiation can only be
provided at the time of execution of the services). For example, an agent may require, for some given
a, detectOilSpill([a,T ],B), where the threshold T and the output processed data image B are as yet
unspecified (T may be associated with constraints, e.g. T ≥ 5).
In summary, we adopt the following description of services:
serviceName(In,Out) : uninstantiated service (abstract service)
serviceName(in,Out) : partially uninstantiated service
serviceName(In,out) : partially uninstantiated service
serviceName(in,out) : fully instantiated service (concrete service)
serviceName = predicate, with serviceName(i,o) ∈ Oas,
for constants or lists of constants i,o
in,out = constants or lists of constants
In,Out = variables or lists of variables
The serviceName can be seen as representing the “type” of service being provided by serviceName(in,out).
We will often refer to an abstract service serviceName(In,Out) simply as serviceName. Note that an ab-
stract or partially instantiated service can be seen logically as representing a disjunction of concrete
services (one for each possible instantiation). We could thus see the process of negotiating an instanti-
ation of an abstract or partially instantiated service as the process of negotiating a concrete service in a
set of alternatives (the disjuncts).
For our scenario, we need four types of services, namely satImage and three processing services
(with serviceName one of f ormatConversion, repro jection and detectOilSpill). We have already seen
examples of concrete services of type satImage and detectOilSpill.
2.2 Roles and Protocols
A role is defined as a tuple 〈rid,PC〉where rid ∈RIas is the label of the role, and PC is a Protocol Clause,
understood in this paper as a (non-empty and finite) set of Operations defined as follows:
Operation = ψ[send(m, i,rid′)]φ (send operation)
| ψ[receive(m, i,rid′)]φ (receive operation)
ψ ∈ Las∪Oas (precondition)
φ ∈ Las (postcondition)
m ∈ ACLas (locution)
i ∈ AIas (unique identifier of agent)
rid′ ∈ RIas (role label)
Intuitively, each operation has has three parts: a locution m in ACLas, an identifier i in AIas of the
communicative partner (i.e. the intended recipient or the actual sender of message m, respectively for
send and receive), and the identifier rid′ of the role that the agent i is intended to be playing when
receiving or sending the message (respectively for send and receive). An agent can send or receive the
3 Here, a represents the input raw satellite data, 5 is the acceptable threshold for false positives and b is the output processed
data image, as computed by the provider of detectOilSpill. Note that algorithms for detecting oil spills may occasionally give
false positives, namely indicate that there is an oil spill at some location where in reality no oil spill is present there. The lower
the acceptable false positive threshold requested from a service, the more expensive the service.
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locution (according to what the operation specifies) if and only if the evaluation mechanism of the agent
evaluates the precondition ψ to true. Once the message is sent or received, the postcondition φ will
automatically hold (namely the evaluation mechanism of the agent will evaluate this condition positively
after the message is sent or received, until further changes). Moreover, when an agent i′ playing some role
〈rid,PC〉 sends a locution send(m, i,rid′) to some other agent i, i receives the message from i′ indicating
that i′ sent it while playing role rid: receive(m, i′,rid). This message will be “processed” by i using the
role with identifier rid′.
Note that our models could adopt other formalisms for communication, e.g. non-determinisitc finite-
state automata. We have chosen here the simple formalism of protocol clauses in order to ground our
models fully, and as this formalism is an abstraction of several existing formalisms for modelling inter-
agent communication, e.g. LCC [12].
To illustrate roles, consider a simple example where an agent playing the role of requester (of some
service S) sends a request to an agent it believes to be a provider of S, and requiring it to be playing
the role of provider of S. The provider agent replies with accept or re f use depending on whether it is
indeed a provider of that service S (and it wants to sell that service) or not (respectively).
〈requester(S), { toBuy(S)∧provides(Ag,S)[send(request(S),Ag,provider(S))]r(S,Ag),
r(S,Ag)[receive(accept,Ag,provider(S))]bought(S),
r(S,Ag)[receive(refuse,Ag,provider(S))]true }〉
〈provider(S), { true[receive(request(S),Ag,requester(S))]reqBy(Ag,S),
reqBy(Ag,S)∧ toSell(S)[send(accept,Ag,requester(S))]sold(S),
reqBy(Ag,S)∧ ¬ toSell(S)[send(refuse,Ag,requester(S))]true }〉
Note that we use here two protocol clause schemata, where variables S and Ag are used instead of
concrete values. These variables are implicitly universally quantified over the appropriate languages.
A protocol clause for a role defines the communicative actions for any agent adopting the role. How-
ever, protocol clauses typically relate to other protocol clauses and give a global picture of the interaction
amongst agents and roles. For the earlier example, the two roles, requester(S) and provider(S), are re-
lated to one another to form a simple negotiation protocol. Intuitively, a protocol is a (non-empty and
finite) set of protocol clauses for roles in Roles that are “related” to one another, possibly indirectly.
With an abuse of notation, we will often refer to a role simply by its identifier and will use the
identifier to stand for the corresponding protocol clauses. Moreover, when an agent needs to play the
role of requester for any service, we use requester to stand for requester(s) for any service s ∈ Services.
Finally, we use provider(serviceName) to indicate that a service provider can provide all instances of
an abstract service serviceName(In,Out) or when we are interested in the provision of some instance of
this service without specifying which one.
2.3 Agents
For the purposes of VOs, an agent can be seen abstractly as a tuple 〈i,R,G〉 where i ∈ AIas is the unique
identifier for the agent; R⊆ Roles is a (non-empty) set of roles that the agent can play within the society;
G ⊆ Las is a (non-empty) set of goals of the agent.
An agent is also equipped with an evaluation mechanism for determining whether (i) preconditions
in roles are satisfied, (ii) goals are fulfilled by the agent in isolation. This mechanism is affected by
the execution of protocols in that postconditions of protocol clauses are taken into account by this eval-
uation mechanism (they are satisfied after the protocol clause is executed, until overwritten by further
postconditions). We do not include this evaluation mechanism within the representation of an agent in a
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society as this mechanism is private to agents and different agents may adopt different such mechanisms
in general.
Roles and goals of an agent 〈i,R,G〉 are inter-related as follows:
(a) ∀r ∈ R, ∃g ∈ G which “enables” i to adopt r, namely the need to fulfil g is a precondition for one
of the protocol clauses in r;
(b) ∀g ∈ G, ∃r ∈ R such that playing the role r gives i a “chance of fulfilling” g namely one of the
protocol clauses in r admits the fulfilment of g as one of its postconditions.
For example, in the earlier protocol clause for the role requester(S), toBuy(S) corresponds to a
goal, and bought(S) corresponds to the goal being fulfilled. Example agents for our scenario are
〈clientAg,{requester},{toBuy(someI), toBuy(someD)}〉
〈satERS1Ag,{requester(detectOilSpill), provider(satImage)}, {toSell(someI)}〉
〈detectAg,{provider(detectOilSpill)},{toSell(someD)}〉
where someI is of the form satImage(in,Out) and someD is of the form detectOilSpill([Out, t],Out ′)
for some in and t (as discussed earlier). Here, the agent identified by clientAg represents the government
ministry and can only play the requester role (for any service), the agent identified by satERS1Ag rep-
resents the ERS-1 satellite and can play both the requester role for detectOilSpill services and the
provider role for satImage services, and the agent identified by detectAg can play only the provider
role for detectOilSpill services. The agents’ goals allow them to engage in interactions following the
protocols for the roles they are equipped with (see the simple protocol clauses of section 2.2).
2.4 Workflows
We see workflows simply as (non-empty) sets of services4 possibly annotated with “constraints”, that
are sentences in Las. Services may be abstract, partially instantiated or concrete, as in section 2.1. As an
example, consider the annotated workflow (consisting of a single partially instantiated service)
{satImage([38.0,−9.4,Res,500,5,SensorType],Out put)}
⋃
{(Res ∈ [900,1100],(SensorType ∈ {radar,optical}}
where the resolution Res and SensorType arguments are constrained within the annotation.
We require that the constraints annotating workflows are satisfiable in Las. Annotations only make
sense for workflows with at least one partially instantiated or abstract service. They are intended to
restrict the possible instantiations of the services in the workflow. Typically, as in the example above,
they pose restrictions on the variables occurring in the services in the workflow.
We will adopt the following terminology: an abstract workflow is a workflow with at least one
abstract or partially instantiated service (with or without annotations); a concrete workflow is a workflow
consisting solely of concrete services (without annotations).
Note that a concrete workflow may or may not be executable, and that, prior to execution of a work-
flow, may need to be appropriately set up. In this paper, we focus on the formation phase of VOs and
ignore execution issues that may occur in the operation phase.
2.5 Contracts
Inspired by web service contract standards [1], we define a contract as 〈Cid,Context,SDT,GT 〉 where
4More generally, workflows can be compositions, e.g. by sequencing or parallel execution, of services.
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• Cid ∈CIas is a unique identifier for the contract
• Context indicates all agents bound by the contract (the “contracted parties”), and their role in the
contract; formally, it is a set of pairs of the form (AgentId,AgentRole) such that 〈AgentId,R, 〉 ∈
Agents and AgentRole ⊆ R
• SDT , the Service Description Terms, is a workflow, consisting of services being contracted,
• GT , the Guarantee Terms, is a (possibly empty) set of sentences in Las that define the assurances
with regards to the services described in SDT .
The GT component of a contract may also include rewards/penalties for the contracted parties and refer
to roles (and protocols) to be used by agents in the case of exceptional system behaviour. For example,
if blame for failure is disputed, there may be a clause in GT defining a protocol for arbitration.
By definition of Context, we require that the contracted parties play, within the contract, some of
the roles they are equipped with. We require that there are at least two different agents involved in any
contract, and that there is at least one agent playing the role of requester(s) and at least one agent playing
the role of provider(s) for some service s, namely:
• ∃(id1,role1),(id2,role2) ∈Context such that id1 6= id2, and requester(s) ∈ role1, provider(s) ∈
role2.
We exclude the possibility that the same agent may be a provider and a requester for the same service:
• 6 ∃(id,role) ∈Context such that, for some s ∈ Services, {requester(s), provider(s)} ⊆ role.
We require that for all the services in SDT there exists an agent in Context providing that service:
• ∀s ∈ SDT , ∃(id,role) ∈Context such that role = provider(s).
A simple example of a contract is:
〈 contractX ,{〈clientAg,{requester( f ormatConversion)}〉,〈procF,{provider( f ormatConversion)}〉},
{ f ormatConversion([image. jpeg, jpegTOgi f ], imageGIF.gi f )},
{dueBy(ImageGIF.gi f ,1400hrs,12.4.09),
priceReduced(ImageGIF,1400hrs,12.4.09,reduction(0.5)}〉
The contract, identified as contractX , is between clientAg and procF for the delivery of (an in-
stance of) the service f ormatConversion, for converting the file image. jpeg using the operation called
jpegTOgi f . The service has a due delivery date specified using the dueBy predicate. The clause on
priceReduced specifies that the price charged will be halved if the provider fails to deliver on time.
2.6 From Agents and Services to the Agent Society
Given Agents as in section 2.3 and Services as in section 2.1 an agent society “emerges” with:
• Roles =
⋃
〈i,R,G〉∈Agents R (the possible roles are all roles that agents within the society can play)
• the concrete workflows in Work f lows are all possible (non-empty) sets of services, namely (2Services−
/0) ⊂ Work f lows; the remaining elements of Work f lows are abstract, possibly annotated “ver-
sions” of these concrete workflows
• Contracts is built solely from elements of Work f lows, Roles and Agents.
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Moreover, we require that each service is “represented” by an agent within the society, in other words
the possible services in the society correspond to all services the agents can provide:
• ∀s ∈ Services, ∃〈provider(s), 〉 ∈ Roles
However, it may be the case that several alternative protocols exist in the society for the same role,
namely: 〈rid,PC〉 and 〈rid,PC′〉 both belong to Roles for PC 6= PC′. The creation of a VO will need to
address the choice of protocols being used for negotiation of workflows and contracts.
3 The VO Formation Phase
VOs can be defined as tuples < Avo,Gvo,Rvo,W fvo,Convo > where:
• Avo ⊆ Agents
∗ with Agents∗ = {〈i,R′,G′〉|〈i,R,G〉 ∈ Agents and R′ ⊆ R, G′ ⊆ G}; Avo contains at
least two agents and exactly one agent in Avo is referred to as the initiating agent, denoted ag0
• Gvo is a set of goals for the agents in Avo, which contains at least a goal of the initiating agent:
Gvo ⊆
⋃
〈i,R,G〉∈Agents G and G0∩Gvo 6= /0, where 〈ag0,R0,G0〉 ∈ Agents
• Rvo is a set of roles to be played by the participating agents, where Rvo ⊆ Roles
• W fvo ⊆Work f lows is the workflow of services currently agreed amongst the agents in Avo
• Convo ⊆Contracts is a set of contracts between the agents in Avo
Agents∗ represents the set of all possible “full” or “partial” specifications of agents, corresponding to
concrete choices of roles agents may play and goals they may focus on within a specific VO. Avo describes
the (partial specifications of) agents involved in the VO, as providers or requestors of services, or in
whichever other roles, as indicated by Rvo. Avo only describes the agents insofar as their involvement
in the VO is concerned (and thus possibly omitting some of their goals and roles, not relevant to the
VO). The W fvo and Convo components determine the behaviour of the VO and its members during
the execution and dissolution phases of VOs. The Gvo and Vvo components are related to the the Avo
component in that Gvo =
⋃
〈i,R,G〉∈Avo G and Rvo =
⋃
〈ag0,R0,G0〉∈Avo R.
In our model, a VO is produced, during the formation phase, through interactions amongst the agents
composing the VO. These interactions can be understood in terms of several operations progressively
refining “partial” representations of VOs. These operations are defined as transitions, as outlined below.
In the remainder, Ids(A) refers to all identifiers of (partial specifications of) agents in the set A.
3.1 Goal Identification
The identify goals transition results in the additions of the initiating agent ag0 and (some of) its goals
into the partial VO tuple. These are goals that the agent cannot achieve on its own. Given < /0, /0, /0, /0, /0 >
identi f y goal
−−−−−−−→< Ainit ,Ginit , /0, /0, /0 >, then
• Ainit = {〈ag0, /0,Ginit〉} for some 〈ag0,R0,G0〉 ∈ Agents such that some goals G
′
0 ⊆ G0 cannot be
fulfilled by ag0 in isolation;
• Ginit = G
′
0
Here, goal fulfilment is determined using the evaluation mechanism of agent ag0 (see section 2.3).
Note that no role is yet identified for ag0: this will be done in transition establish roles (see section 3.4).
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Assume, for example, that clientAg is informed by its user that a possible oil spill has been reported
by a passing vessel. The user provides the latitude and longitude, acceptable false positive threshold
and scan area. Armed with its user’s parameters the agent initiates the VO formation process by first
identifying its goals. The parameters correspond to high-level goals, that will later be decomposed into
specific workflows. In the example, the high-level goal detectPossibleOilspill(38.0,−9.4,500,5) given
by the user is to detect an oceanic oil spill off the Portuguese coast at a latitude and longitude of 38.0 and
-9.4 with an acceptable false positive threshold of 5% for the surrounding 500 square kilometres. The
agent may decide that to satisfy this high-level goal it needs two services:
g1 = toBuy(satImage([38.0,−9.4, ,500, ,radar, ], )), and
g2 = toBuy(oilSpillDetect([ , ,5], ))
where the sensor-type for the satellite providing the image must be radar, because of the required
resolution and weather conditions, and once this image data is obtained a service is needed to provide
the actual identification of the oil spills on the images. In summary, identify goals will compute Ainit =
{〈clientAg, /0,Ginit〉} and Ginit = {g1,g2}.
Note that in our model goals of VOs emerge from goals of agents. Once the goals of VOs have been
identified, they will dictate the behaviour of agents during the operation of VOs.
3.2 Partner Discovery
The discover partners transition results in the addition of a number of agents to the set of agents in the
current partial VO (after identify goals). Whether by traditional means such as a yellow page registry
or through ‘friend of a friend’ discovery utilising the multiagent system, the VO tuple is transformed
to include potential partners that the initiating agent believes will help it reach its goals, notably by
providing suitable services. Given < Ainit ,Ginit , /0, /0, /0 >
discover partners
−−−−−−−−−→ < Apot ,Ginit , /0, /0, /0 >, Apot =
Ainit
⋃
Aqueryresult with Aqueryresult including these potential partners is such that
• Aqueryresult ⊆ Agents
∗−Ainit and each element in Aqueryresult is of the form 〈i, /0, /0〉
• each agent in Aqueryresult is a provider of one of the services in Ginit namely, for each i∈ Ids(Aqueryresult),
if 〈i,R,G〉 ∈ Agents then ∃s such that toBuy(s) ∈ Ginit such that 〈provider(s),PC〉 ∈ R.
In our example, clientAg finds that two satellite image providers advertise the services it is interested
in. Both agents satERS1ag and radSatAg represent a radar-capable polar satellite with orbits amenable
to the area of interest. Moreover, there is one agent, procOSAg, who can provide the type of image
processing in which clientAg is interested. After this transition is completed,
Aqueryresult = {〈satERS1ag, /0, /0〉,〈radSatAg, /0, /0〉,〈procOSAg, /0, /0〉}
3.3 Partner Selection
The set of potential partners discovered by ag0 may include unreliable or untrustworthy ones. The select
partners transition allows the agent to prune the results of the discover partners transition. We do not
provide a detailed specification of the pruning mechanism needed to support this stage as this is largely
dependent on mechanisms for assessing trustworthiness and reliability. Several such mechanisms exist
in the literature. Any could be used here.
Generally, given < Apot ,Ginit , /0, /0, /0 >
select partners
−−−−−−−−→< Apre,Ginit , /0, /0, /0 >, then
• Apre ⊆ Apot
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• ag0 ∈ Ids(Apre)
• for each s such that toBuy(s) ∈ Ginit there exists i ∈ Ids(Apre) such that
if 〈i,R,G〉 ∈ Agents then
∃〈provider(s),PC〉 ∈ R.
In the example, after the select partners transition is completed:
Apre = {〈clientAg, /0,Ginit〉,〈satERS1ag, /0, /0〉,〈procOSag, /0, /0〉}.
Note that in general several providers of the same service may still be in Apre after the pruning.
3.4 Establish Roles
Before the agents are able to negotiate workflows and contracts, the roles they will be playing in the ne-
gotiation need to be established. These roles (with their protocols) are the social norms used for forming
the VO. Establishing these roles also amounts to establishing protocols for them (as our roles include
protocols). Roles include requester and provider roles, but may also include other roles (e.g. that of arbi-
trator, or contract-negotiator if agents other than provider and requester agents may be needed to support
the contract negotiation stage of VO formation). For simplicity, we assume that these roles are decided
by the initiating agent, and that, given < Apre,Ginit , /0, /0, /0 >
establish roles
−−−−−−−→< Aroles,Ginit ,Rvo, /0, /0 >, then
• Ids(Apre)⊆ Ids(Aroles)
• Aroles = A
∗
pre∪Arest , where
– A∗pre =
⋃
〈i, /0,G〉∈Apre{〈i,Ri,Gi〉} for some Ris such that Ri ⊆R
∗
i and Gi ⊆G
∗
i where 〈i,R
∗
i ,G
∗
i 〉 ∈
Agents
– Arest ⊆ Agents
∗ (where Arest may be empty)
– Arest ∩A
∗
pre = /0
• Rvo =
⋃
〈i,Ri, 〉∈Aroles{Ri}
• for each s such that toBuy(s)∈Ginit , there exists exactly one 〈provider(s),PCprovider(s)〉 and exactly
one 〈requester(s),PCrequester(s)〉 in Rvo
• for every 〈r1,PCr1〉 and 〈r2,PCr2〉 in Rvo, if r1 = r2 then PCr1 = PCr2 , namely there is exactly one
role for each role identifier in Rvo.
Note that we do not impose that ag0 plays the role of requester of all the services in the workflow it
wants to instantiate: indeed, in general it may be possible that ag0 delegates the task of requesting some
or all services to some other agent. In particular, it may be the case that 〈ag0, /0,Ginit〉 belongs to Aroles.
Also, we allow for the same agent to play several roles in a VO (namely, 〈i,Ri,Gi〉 may belong to Aroles
with Ri containing more than one role).
In our running example, once the establish roles stage is completed:
Aroles = { 〈clientAg, {〈requester(satImage([38.0,−9.4, ,500, ,radar, ], )),PC1〉,
〈requester(oilSpillDetect([ , ,5], )),PC2〉},Ginit〉,
〈satERS1ag,
{〈provider(satImage([38.0,−9.4, ,500, ,radar, ], )),PC3〉}, /0〉,
〈procOSag,{〈provider(oilSpillDetect([ , ,5], )),PC4〉}, /0〉}
Rvo = { 〈requester(toBuy(satImage([38.0,−9.4, ,500, ,radar, ], ))),PC1〉,
〈requester(toBuy(oilSpillDetect([ , ,5], ))),PC2〉,
〈provider(toBuy(satImage([38.0,−9.4, ,500, ,radar, ], ))),PC3〉,
〈provider(toBuy(oilSpillDetect([ , ,5], ))),PC4〉}
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Here, the PCi are protocol clauses that the agents commit to follow during the negotiation of workflows.
In this specific example, no role/protocol is specified for the agree contract transition. Note that other
agents may be brought into Aroles at this stage to play these new roles.
3.5 Negotiation
The negotiation activities in the VO formation amount to 1) agreeing a concrete workflow (agree Wf )
and 2) agreeing a set of contracts amongst agents contributing to the workflow, by providing services
in it, and the initiating agents (stage agree contract). Both transitions make use of roles (and protocols)
identified at the establish roles transition: communicating by following these protocols, agents agree on
the provision of services and contracts. Negotiation may result in additional goals to be added, as goals
of agents providing services. The agree contract transition may cause no changes in the partial VO tuple,
if no suitable roles have been computed by the establish roles transition. For lack of space we will only
describe the agree Wf transition.
In order for the computed VO to be meaningful, it needs to compute a workflow that is concrete
or partially instantiated, but can be fully instantiated when the workflow is executed. This workflow
instantiates the abstract workflow corresponding to the toBuy goals in Ginit . This instantiation may be
obtained after several negotiations, each following the protocols of the roles identified after the establish
roles transition, each resulting in a service becoming instantiated. After each instantiation, the initiating
agent puts those instantiated services into the workflow component of the VO tuple.
Generally, given < Aroles,Ginit ,Rvo, /0, /0 >
agree W f
−−−−−→< Avo,Gvo,Rvo,W fvo, /0 >, then
• Ids(Avo)⊆ Ids(Aroles)
• ag0 ∈ Ids(Avo)
• for each s such that toBuy(s)∈Ginit there exists exactly one agent i∈ Ids(Avo) such that 〈i,Ri,Gi〉 ∈
Avo and provider(s) ∈ Ri, and a successful dialogue between ag0 and this agent i with ag0 playing
the role of requester(s) and i playing the role of provider(s)
• for each 〈i,Ri,Gi〉 ∈ Avo, if 〈i,R
∗
i ,G
∗
i 〉 ∈ Aroles then
R∗i = Ri (namely roles cannot be changed at this stage)
Gi ⊇ G
∗
i (namely goals can only be added at this stage)
if 〈i,R∗∗i ,G
∗∗
i 〉 ∈ Agents then Gi ⊆ G
∗∗
i (namely all goals are chosen from the pool of goals of the
agent)
• Ginit ⊆ Gvo
• Gvo =
⋃
〈i,Ri,Gi〉∈Avo Gi
Intuitively, agents may decide to add goals at this stage to avoid agreements to provide a service
which could prevent the fulfillment of some of their goals. We impose that the initiating agent is not
allowed to change the workflow. However, it can add constraints or services to it, as soon as no new
role is required by this addition. For example, this would be needed and useful to support shimming5 of
services. Goals of provider agents may render this shimming necessary (e.g. because a service provider
does not want to interface to another service provider).
5Informally, shimming is the introduction of a service into a workflow to ensure that the output of a preceding service
matches the type required by the input of the subsequent service.
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Note that one single provider per service is required. These providers will need to be selected
amongst all agents that have successfully completed a dialogue with ag0. We do not impose any con-
straints on how this choice is performed: the given protocols may typically dictate this.
• W fvo is the result of instantiating W f by the given sequence of successful dialogues, as dictated
by Gvo; the providers of the services are given by Avo.
4 Conclusions
We have described a formalisation for VOs in grid and service-oriented architectures, formed from agent
societies, using a realistic scenario for illustration throughout. This formalisation is abstract and inde-
pendent of any realisation choices (in terms of agent architectures, communication platform etc). It can
guide the development of (agent-based) VOs, in that it identifies essential components (such as several
underlying languages for services, identifiers, communication, as well as protocol-based roles for nego-
tiation of services and contracts). We have experimented with some of the interactions presented here
for the earth observation scenario [3] with emphasis on the coordination patterns agents should follow
when creating a VO [15].
Our emphasis on the use of protocols to support VOs is also advocated by [9]. The CONOISE-G [10]
project presented an agent-based model for VOs on the grid, but focused on the challenging task of
engineering a working system and thus making concrete realisation choices (e.g. agents use a constraint
satisfaction algorithm for decision-making). We have taken a more abstract view of agents, agent society
and VOs, to ensure that the definitions can be ported to any other agent-enabled grid systems to support
VOs in general. Papers such as [4] speculate on the consequences of introducing software agents as a
means to alleviate the burden on human decision-making. We have a similar focus in that we see an
opportunity, by utilising the multiagent paradigm. There are a few papers that have formalised aspects
of agent-enabled VOs, for example [11] look at voting protocols for VOs while [14] focuses on the
representation of contracts in VOs based on a specific commitment-based approach for them. We have
taken a more exhaustive view by considering all components of agent-enabled VOs but more abstractly.
As future work, it will be important to further validate the proposed model with further examples, e.g.
in e-business and pharma settings, as well as formally verifying that the VO formation model provided
results in “coherent” VOs, namely VOs where all agents involved can fulfil their relevant goals as a result
of the participation in the VO, given that the VO is executed as agreed.
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Abstract. This paper studies the development of autonomic and secure
Virtual Organisations (VOs) when following the chemical-programming
paradigm.We have selected the Higher-Order Chemical Language (HOCL)
as the representative of the chemical paradigm, due mainly to its gen-
erality, its implicit autonomic property, and its potential application to
emerging computing paragidms such as Grid computing and service com-
puting. We have advocated the use of aspect-oriented techniques, where
autonomicity and security can be seen as cross-cutting concerns impact-
ing the whole system. We show how HOCL can be used to model VOs,
exemplified by a VO system for the generation of digital products. We
develop patterns for HOCL, including patterns for traditional security
properties such as authorisation and secure logs, as well as autonomic
properties such as self-protection and self-healing. The patterns are ap-
plied to HOCL programs following an aspect-oriented approach, where
aspects are modelled as transformation functions that add to a program
a cross-cutting concern.
1 Introduction
The concept of Virtual Organisation (VO) is given attention by researchers
within a wide range of fields, from social anthropology and organisational the-
ory to computer science. Its importance resides in providing an abstraction to
represent organisational collaborations, a topic of fresh interest given the cur-
rent exploitation of Internet to create virtual enterprises [5], or the sharing of
resources across different organisations as envisaged by Grid computing [7].
This paper studies the development of VOs when using a chemical program-
ming paradigm. Chemical programming is a computational paradigm inspired
by the chemical metaphor, where computation is seen as reactions between
molecules in a chemical solution. Examples of chemical-programming frame-
works include P-Systems [13], the Higher-Order Chemical Language (HOCL) [1]
⋆ This paper will be published in the proceedings of SSS’2009, the 11th International
Symposium on Stabilization, Safety, and Security of Distributed Systems. This work
has been partially funded by the EU CoreGRID (IST FP6 No 004265) and GridTrust
(IST FP6 No 033817) projects.
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and Fraglets [14], among others. Potentiality of the paradigm has been shown
by its application to solve problems as diverse as page ranking of biochemical
databases [12], coordination of services [3], or protocol resilience [15].
A VO can be seen as a temporary or permanent coalition of geographically
dispersed organisations that pool resources, capabilities and information in order
to achieve common goals. Autonomicity is an important property in VOs, since
coalition members should act autonomously in order to achieve the VO goals.
The chemical programming paradigm is very relevant to the programming of
autonomic systems as it captures the intuition of a collection of cooperative
components which evolve freely according to some predefined constraints (reac-
tion rules). Security is also an important concern in VOs, since such a coalition
may include unknown organisations that are untrusted by other VO partners.
We introduce here a method for modelling autonomic and secure VOs in
HOCL using aspect-oriented techniques. We have selected HOCL as the language
representative of the chemical paradigm, due mainly to its generality, its implicit
autonomic property — HOCL is based on the Gamma calculus [1], which is also
the foundation of other chemical frameworks such as Fraglets — and its potential
application to emerging computing paradigms such as service computing [3].
We define first a set of patterns for HOCL programs, representing security and
autonomic properties. Each property is modelled then as an aspect, defined using
the patterns, which is weaved following a code pre-processing technique.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 introduces HOCL. Sec-
tion 3 discusses the autonomic properties of HOCL and describes its application
to VOs, exemplified by a system for the generation of digital products. Section
4 presents security patterns for chemical programs. Section 5 describes the use
of aspect-oriented techniques in HOCL. Next, section 6 shows how to apply the
security patterns by using aspect-oriented programming. Section 7 relates our
work with others. Finally, section 8 concludes the paper and highlights future
work.
2 The Higher-Order Chemical Language
In this section we introduce the main features of HOCL, referring the reader
to [2] for a more complete presentation. A chemical program can be seen as a
(symbolic) chemical solution where data is represented by floating molecules and
computation by chemical reactions between them. When some molecules match
and fulfill a reaction condition, they are replaced by the body of the reaction.
That process goes on until an inert solution is reached: the solution is said to be
inert when no reaction can occur anymore.
In HOCL, a chemical solution is represented by a multiset and reaction rules
specify multiset rewritings. Every entity is a molecule, including reaction rules.
A program is a molecule, that is to say, a multiset of atoms (A1, . . . , An) which
can be constants (integers, booleans, etc.), sub-solutions (〈M〉) or reaction rules.
Compound molecules (M1,M2) are built using the associative and commutative
operator “,”, which formalises the Brownian motion and can always be used to
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reorganise molecules. The execution of a chemical program consists in triggering
reactions until the solution becomes inert. A reaction involves a reaction rule
replace-one P by M if C and a molecule N that satisfies the pattern P and
the reaction condition C. The reaction consumes the rule and the molecule N ,
and produces M . Formally:
(replace-one P by M if C), N −→ φM
if P match N = φ and φC
where φ is the substitution obtained by matching N with P . It maps every
variable defined in P to a sub-molecule from N . For example, the rule in
〈0, 10, 8, replace-one x by 9 if x > 9〉
can react with 10. They are replaced by 9. The solution becomes the inert solu-
tion 〈0, 9, 8〉.
A molecule inside a solution cannot react with a molecule outside the solution
(i.e. the construct 〈.〉 can be seen as a membrane). A HOCL program is a solution
which can contain reaction rules that manipulate other molecules (reaction rules,
sub-solutions, etc.) of the solution.
In the remaining of the paper, we use some syntactic sugar such as decla-
rations let x = M1 in M2 which is equivalent to M2 where all the free occur-
rences of x are replaced by M1. The reaction rules replace-one P by M if C
are one-shot: they are consumed when they react. Their variant denoted by
replace P by M if C are n-shot, i.e. they do not disappear when they react.
There are usually many possible reactions making the execution of chemical
programs highly parallel and non-deterministic. Since reactions involve only a
few molecules and react independently of the context, many distinct reactions
can occur at the same time. For example, consider the program of Figure 1
that computes the prime numbers lower than 10 using a chemical version of the
Eratosthenes’ sieve.
let sieve = replace x, y by x if x div y in
〈sieve, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10〉
Fig. 1. Chemical prime numbers program.
The rule sieve reacts with two integers x and y such that x divides y, and returns
x (i.e. removes y). Initially several reactions are possible, for example sieve, 2, 8
(replaced by sieve, 2) or sieve, 3, 9 (replaced by sieve, 3) or sieve, 2, 10, etc. The
solution becomes inert when the rule sieve cannot react with any couple of
integers in the solution, that is to say, when the solution contains only prime
numbers. The result of the computation in our example is 〈sieve, 2, 3, 5, 7〉.
An important feature of HOCL is the notion of multiplets. A multiplet is a
finite multiset of identical elements. In this paper, we limit ourselves to multiplets
of basic values (integers, booleans, strings). In HOCL multiplets are defined and
matched using an exponential notation: if v is a basic value then vk (k > 0)
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denotes a multiplet of k elements v. Likewise, for variable x having a basic type,
notation xk denotes a multiplet of k elements. We could also have variables in the
exponentiation of constants or patterns, indicating that the size of a multiplet
becomes dynamic.
3 Virtual Organisations in HOCL
3.1 Autonomicity in HOCL
Autonomic computing provides a vision in which systems manage themselves
according to some predefined goals. The essence of autonomic computing is self-
organisation. Like biological systems, autonomic systems maintain and adjust
their operation in the face of changing components, workloads, demands and
external conditions, such as hardware or software failures, either innocent or
malicious. The autonomic system might continually monitor its own use and
check for component upgrades. HOCL is very appropriate as a programming
model to express programs with autonomic behaviours. The reason is twofold.
First, HOCL is intrinsically dynamic: rules are executed until an inert state
is reached. When the multiset is modified, then reactions rules are executed
to achieve again the inertness. Secondly, the high-order promoted by HOCL
allows some policies to be replaced at runtime by new ones. Policies can be
expressed by a set of rules that are stored in the multiset and thus can be
replaced thanks to the execution of some other rules (high-order). An autonomic
system is implemented using control loops that monitor the system and executes
a set of operations to keep its parameters within a desired scope. A control
loop has four basic steps: monitor, analyse, plan and execute. All these steps
can be mapped onto chemical objects. Monitor and execute can be represented
by external input/output operations into the multiset by generating molecules
whereas analyse and plan are a set of chemical rules that express the autonomic
behavior. A simple autonomic mail system [2] has been developed as an example
of programming self-organisation with HOCL.
3.2 Programming Autonomic Virtual Organisations in HOCL
We model here a VO with the goal of generating products resulting from the
collaboration of several dispersed organisations, which possesses the following
characteristics:
1. The VO aims at producing some complex, sophisticated ’digital’ product
(e.g. a software system, or some multimedia product).
2. The VO consists of a defined number of members (organisations), each one
contributing to the generation of products.
3. The product generation is considered a knowledge-intensive and content-
intensive activity. VO members depend on and need access to several sources
of knowledge as well as digital content assets, which they assemble/use to
create the product.
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4. The production process is structured along some workflow (e.g. a software
production process, or a Web/content publishing process), and foresees sev-
eral phases. Policies may be applied to control access to the assets, which
may vary according to the phase or state in the project workflow.
For our scenario, we are assuming a very simple workflow depicted in Figure
2. The workflow consists of four phases. In the Edit phase, work is distributed
among all VO members contributing to the generation of a product. In the Merge
phase, parts of the product created by each VO member are combined in order
to create a global product. Once the global product is created, it is passed to
the VO members in the Validate phase, so they can ”validate” the product.
Finally, the process finalises if the product is approved by a determined number
of members by sending the product to Publish.
Fig. 2. Workflow process for the VO supporting the generation of a product.
For the case of our VO for product generation, the whole VO is modelled
as a solution, which contains sub-solutions Si:〈· · · 〉 that represent the VO mem-
bers. The product under construction is modelled as a molecule that could be
tagged by another molecule representing the product status (EDITING, EDITED,
GENERATE, VALIDATING, VALIDATED, ACCEPTING and PUBLISHED). Workflow op-
erations (edit, merge, publish, etc.) are represented as reactions. Table 1 sum-
marises the chemical modelling of the main elements of our VO.
VO Concept Chemical Representation
VO Solution
VO Member Sub-solution
Workflow Operation Reaction
Product Molecule
Product Status Molecule
Table 1. Chemical representation of the main elements of a virtual organisation for
the collaborative generation of products
Figure 3 shows the HOCL program for generating a product. It consists
of a solution containing all VO members —represented as subsolutions Si for
i = 1, · · · , k, and molecule GlobalProduct, the product to be published.
The reaction rule edit distributes the global product to all VO members.
Here we are assuming the existence of k VO members, where k is a predefined
integer constant. Reaction merge generates a local product, and marks the con-
tribution of the corresponding member to the product generation by adding
constant GENERATE to the global solution. It also includes operation Merge,
which combines both the local and global products. The edition of a product
finalises when VO members have contributed, which is represented by having
NumMerges(k) copies of molecule GENERATE. Function NumMerges(k) is a
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let publish = replace GlobalProduct, ACCEPTINGx, GENERATEy
by PUBLISHED:GlobalProduct
if x ≥ MinApproval(k) ∧ y = NumMerges(k)
in
let accept = replace S: 〈VALIDATING:Product〉
by S: 〈VALIDATED〉 , ACCEPTING
if AgreeProduct(Product)
in
let valid = replace S: 〈EDITED〉 , GlobalProduct, GENERATEy
by S: 〈VALIDATING:GlobalProduct〉 , GlobalProduct, GENERATEy
if y = NumMerges(k)
in
let merge = replace S: 〈EDITING:Product〉 , GlobalProduct
by S: 〈EDITED〉 ,Merge(Product,GlobalProduct), GENERATE
if FinishProduct(Product)
in
let edit = replace S: 〈〉 , GlobalProduct
by S: 〈EDITING:GlobalProduct〉 , GlobalProduct
in
〈S1: 〈〉 , · · · , Sk: 〈〉 , GlobalProduct, edit, merge, valid, accept, publish〉
Fig. 3. HOCL Program for collaborative generation of a digital product
domain-specific function indicating the number of copies needed to generate a
product; if it is the identity function, i.e. equal to k, all participant solutions
must contribute to the product generation. Note that we are exploiting here
the existence of multiplets in HOCL: molecule GENERATENumMerges(k) acts as
a synchronisation barrier indicating when reaction valid can occur. Reaction
valid distributes the final GlobalProduct among the members in order to get
their approval. Reaction accept allows a VO member to vote for the approval of
the product, which results in adding molecule ACCEPTING in the global solution.
The whole process finalises as soon as MinApproval(k) VO members approve
the final product by executing reaction publish, which sends the final product
to publishing. Function MinApproval(k) is an abstraction of the protocol used
to decide when to publish a product; for instance, if it is equal to ceil(k/2), we
would be using a majority vote protocol.
4 Patterns for Chemical Programming
A composition pattern is a design model that specifies the design of a cross-
cutting requirement independently of any design it may potentially cross-cut,
and how that design may be re-used wherever it may be required [6]. In this sec-
tion we define composition patterns for HOCL programs. These patterns serve
as templates that guide the definition of aspects by instantiating them with
domain-specific information. We define patterns for important security proper-
ties, namely Authorisation and Security Logs; as well as patterns for autonomic
properties such as Self-Protection and Self-Healing.
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Authorisation Pattern. Authorisation is concerned with the verification that
an entity can perform a particular action. In the context of chemical programs,
authorisation refers to the verification that a reaction could occur in a solution.
The authorisation pattern, described in Figure 4, indicates that whenever a
solution S reacts using reaction R, the authorisation condition Authorised(S,R)
holds.
authoZ(S,R) =̂ let R = replace P by M
if C ∧Authorised(S,R)
in S:〈ω,R〉
Fig. 4. HOCL Pattern for Authorisation
The authorisation condition is considered as a generic condition that should
be instantiated with domain-specific information. In this paper, we are inter-
ested in defining authorisation for three particular cases of attributed-based au-
thorisation: role-based access control, authorisation based on trust values, and
authorisation based on environmental conditions such as date, time, etc.
In the case of role-based access control, we associate solutions to roles and
indicate which reactions can be executed by roles. Let SolutionRole be a predi-
cate associating a solution with a role, and RoleReaction a predicate associating
a role with a reaction. In this case the Authorisation condition takes the form
SolutionRole(S,Rol) ∧RoleReaction(Rol,R).
In the case of authorisation based on trust values, we assume there is a
function TrustValue(S) returning the trust value associated to a solution S. The
Authorisation condition is simply a predicate comparing the trust value of a
solution with a particular value.
In the case of authorisation based on environmental conditions, we assume
there are predicates such as Date and Time which could restrict when a reaction
occurs.
Security Log Pattern. In the case of security-critical operations, it might be
required to maintain a security log of such operations. In chemical programming,
this corresponds to storing in a log a reaction as well as the changes it has
produced. Let R = replace P by M if C be a reaction. The security log
pattern, described in Figure 5, indicates that whenever reaction R happens, it
is stored in solution Log a molecule with information about the solutions and
molecules participating in R. The Log solution can be seen as a trusted third
party in charge of storing and maintaining the security log.
logging(R) =̂ let R = replace P, Log:〈ω〉 by M, Log:〈ω,R:P :M〉 if C
in S:〈ω,R〉
Fig. 5. HOCL Pattern for Security Logging
Self-Protection Pattern. Self-protection refers to the ability of anticipating
problems, and taking steps to avoid or mitigate them. It can be decomposed
68
in two phases: a detection phase and a reaction phase [9]. The detection phase
consists mainly in filtering data (pattern matching). The reaction phase con-
sists in preventing offensive data from spreading and sometimes also in counter-
attacking. This mechanism can easily be expressed with the condition-reaction
scheme of the chemical programming. Figure 6 shows the self-protection pattern.
Function Filter rule out undesirable data; on the other hand, function Protect
represents the application of a protection mechanism to the rest of the data.
selfprot(S,R) =̂ let R = replace P,Q by Protect(Q) if Filter(P )
in S:〈ω,R〉
Fig. 6. HOCL Pattern for Self-Protection
Self-Healing Pattern. Another important autonomic property is self-healing,
which refers to the automatic discovery and correction of faults in a system.
We define a pattern for the case in which a partner in a VO — represented
as a solution— fails by replacing it by a back-up partner. The back-up partner
offers his own resources while the original partner cannot contribute to the VO
objective. Functions Failure(S) and Recover(S) are associated to the system
functionality capable of detecting whether a system has failed or recovered from
a previous problem.
fail(S) =̂ replace S: 〈ω〉 by Sbackup: 〈ω〉 if Failure(S)
repair(S) =̂ replace Sbackup: 〈ω〉 by S: 〈ω〉 if Recover(S)
Fig. 7. HOCL Pattern for Self-Healing
5 Aspects for Chemical Programming
Aspect-oriented programming (AOP) is a paradigm that explicitly promotes
separation of concerns. In the context of security, aspects mean that the main
program should not need to encode security information; instead, it should be
moved into a separate, independent piece of code [16].
AOP is based on the idea that computer systems are better programmed
by separately specifying the various concerns of a system and some description
of their relationships, and then relying on mechanisms in the underlying AOP
environment to weave or compose them together into a coherent program. The
goal of AOP is to make designs and code more modular, meaning the concerns
are localised rather than scattered and have well-defined interfaces with the rest
of the system. This provides the usual benefits of modularity, including making
it possible to reason about different concerns in relative isolation, making them
(un)pluggable, amenable to separate development, and so forth.
This section introduces the main concepts of aspects and relates them with
chemical programming.
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5.1 Basic Concepts on AOP
Cross-cutting concerns are concerns whose implementation cuts across a number
of program components. This results in problems when changes to the concern
have to be made —the code to be changed is not localised but is in different places
across the system. Cross-cutting concerns can range from high level notions like
security and quality of service to low-level notions such as caching and buffering.
They can be functional, like features or business rules, or nonfunctional, such
as synchronization and transaction management. The following are the main
terminology used in AOP:
– Join point : Point of execution in the application at which cross-cutting con-
cern needs to be applied. In the case of chemical programming, join points
could be associated with reactions where the concerns need to be applied.
– Advice: This is the additional code that one wants to apply to an existing
model. In the case of chemical programming, advice are applied to joint
points (reactions) by adding/replacing some of the components of the reac-
tion.
– Aspect : An aspect is an abstraction which implements a concern; it is the
combination of a join point and an advice.
– Weaving : The incorporation of advice code at the specific joint points. There
are three approaches to aspect weaving: source code pre-processing, link-time
weaving, and execution-time weaving.
There is an additional concept called the Kind of an Aspect indicating if an
advice is applied before, after, or around a join point. Since there is not a notion
of sequentiality (execution order) in a chemical program, we do not exploit this
feature. All aspects for chemical programming can be seen as around aspects.
5.2 Defining Aspects for Chemical Programming
In this work we have followed a code pre-processing technique to weave aspects
in a chemical program. To do so, we represent aspects as a collection of transfor-
mation functions ΨCi , each one modelling a different cross-cutting concern Ci.
Each function ΨCi is applied to a reaction and returns a modified version of the
reaction that has been transformed according to the aspect.
Let Reaction denote the set of reaction rules and Σ denote the state of a
chemical program. State here refers to the solution and molecules participating
in a program. The signature of a transformation function ΨC is defined as follows:
ΨC :Reaction×Σ → Reaction
As a way of illustration, let us define transformation ΨRBAC that applies the
role-based authorisation concern to a reaction, indicating that a solution could
react using a particular reaction if it is playing a role in the system. Function
ΨRBAC takes as input a reaction, a solution name, and a role name, producing
a new version of the reaction where the condition has been strengthened with
the predicates SolutionRole and RoleReaction, as presented in the authorisation
pattern defined in sub-section 4. Upper part of Figure 8 shows the definition of
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ΨRBAC :Reaction× SolutionName×RoleName→ Reaction
∀R:Reaction, S:SolutionName,Rol:RolName
R = replace P by M if C →
ΨRBAC(R,S,Rol) = R = replace P by M
if C ∧ SolutionRole(S,Rol) ∧RoleReaction(Rol,R)
ΨRBAC(merge, S,Editor) =
merge = replace S: 〈EDITING:Product〉 , GlobalProduct
by S: 〈EDITED〉 , Merge(Product,GlobalProduct), GENERATE
if FinishProduct(Product) ∧
SolutionRole(S,Editor) ∧ RoleReaction(Editor,merge)
Fig. 8. Weaving an aspect: applying the RBAC aspect to reaction merge.
the transformation function ΨRBAC . Let us assume that the merge reaction in
the VO system presented in Figure 3 can react when the solution containing it
is playing the Editor role. Lower part of Figure 8 shows the result of applying
the transformation function ΨRBAC to merge.
6 Applying Patterns and AOP to ‘Chemical’ VOs
In general, our approach for applying AOP techniques to chemical programs com-
prises the following steps. First, requirements for the system under construction
are defined. Second, the requirements are modelled as aspect functions, follow-
ing the patterns introduced in section 4. Third, we define the join points where
the aspects functions should be applied. Finally, aspects are weaved producing a
new chemical program. The rest of this section describes the application of such
approach to the VO for product generation introduced in section 3.2.
Requirements for Product Generation. The system for product generation
has the following security requirements:
1. Organisations participating in the VO could play the roles Editor orValidator .
2. VO members playing the role Editor can execute only operations related to
the edit and merge phases of the workflow.
3. VO members playing the role Validator can execute only operations related
to the validate phases of the workflow.
4. Acceptance of a product is considered a security-critical operation requiring
to be registered in a security log.
5. Acceptance is allowed only for those VO members with a trust value higher
than 0.5.
6. The system must check automatically that any product to be merged is free
of virus.
7. The VO member assigned to location 1, i.e. the member identified as S1, is
considered critical one and must be replaced by a back up member in case
of failure.
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Requirements 1 to 5 are classical security requirements; requirement 6 is a self-
protection one; and requirement 7 is a self-healing requirement.
Aspect Transformation Functions. Figure 9 shows the aspect functions
defined for our VO to deal with the security requirements presented above, and
Figure 10 illustrates the aspect functions defined for self-protection and self-
healing requirements.
ΨRBAC :Reaction× SolutionName × RoleName → Reaction
∀R:Reaction, S:SolutionName, Rol:RolName
R = replace P by M if C →
ΨRBAC(R,S,Rol) = R = replace P by M
if C ∧ SolutionRole(S,Rol) ∧ RoleReaction(Rol,R)
ΨTRUST :Reaction× SolutionName ×ℜ → Reaction
∀R:Reaction, S:SolutionName, t:ℜ
R = replace P by M if C →
ΨTRUST (R,S, t) = R = replace P by M
if C ∧ TrustValue(S) > t
ΨLOG:Reaction→ Reaction
∀R:Reaction
R = replace S:P by M if C →
ΨLOG(R) = R = replace S:P, Log:〈ω〉
by M, Log:〈ω, S:R〉
if C
Fig. 9. Aspect functions for securing the VO for product generation.
In Figure 9, function ΨRBAC models role-based authorisation, following the
authorisation pattern introduced in sub-section 4. We are assuming the under-
lying execution system includes functions SolutionRole, associating a solution
with a role, and RoleReaction, associating a role with the reaction that can per-
form. Likewise, function ΨTRUST models authorisation based on trust values,
following also the pattern from sub-section 4. Here, it is assumed the existence
of function TrustValue, returning the trust value of a solution. Finally, function
ΨLOG models the secure log concern.
In Figure 10, function ΨNOV IRUS models self-protection according to the pat-
tern presented in subsection 4. Here, we are assuming there is a system function
called NoV irus in charge of checking there is not virus in a digital product. On
the other hand, functions ΨFAIL and ΨRECOV ER model self-healing according
to the pattern presented previously.
Defining Join Points. Table 2 illustrates the joint points for our VO according
to the requirements defined previously.
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ΨNOV IRUS :Reaction→ Reaction
∀R:Reaction
R = replace S: 〈EDITING:P 〉 , ω by S: 〈EDITED〉 ,M if C →
ΨNOV IRUS(R) = R = replace S: 〈EDITING:P 〉 , ω
by S: 〈EDITED〉 ,M
if C ∧ NoV irus(P )
ΨFAIL:SolutionName× SolutionName→ Reaction
ΨRECOV ER:SolutionName× SolutionName→ Reaction
∀S, Sbackup:SolutionName
ΨFAIL(S, Sbackup) = fail = replace S: 〈ω〉 by Sbackup: 〈ω〉 if Failure(S)
ΨRECOV ER(S, Sbackup) = recover = replace Sbackup: 〈ω〉 by S: 〈ω〉 if Recover(S)
Fig. 10. Aspect functions for self-protection and self-healing in the VO for product
generation.
Requirement Aspect Requirement Aspect
1, 2 ΨRBAC(edit, S, Editor) 5 ΨTRUST (accept, S, 0.5)
1, 2 ΨRBAC(merge, S, Editor) 6 ΨNOV IRUS(merge)
1, 3 ΨRBAC(valid, S, V alidator) 7 ΨFAIL(S1, S1backup)
1, 3 ΨRBAC(accept, S, V alidator) 7 ΨRECOV ER(S1, S1backup)
4 ΨLOG(accept)
Table 2. Join points to apply aspect functions to the product generation VO
At this stage, we can see the modularity obtained by applying AOP tech-
niques. Any change in the security requirements implies only changes in the
definition of aspect functions and join points, without altering the business logic
of the program. For instance, if the requirement that the accept reaction should
be performed only by solutions with their trust above a particular value is re-
moved, then the only changes required are to remove ΨTRUST function and to
eliminate the corresponding rule in Table 2.
Aspect Weaving. Finally, the aspects are weaved producing a new program.
The chemical program resulting after weaving the aspects defined in Table 2 is
presented in Figure 11. For instance, comparing reactionmerge with the original
version presented in Figure 3, we can notice that the condition of the rule has
been strengthened restricting the execution only to solutions playing the role
Editor and when the product to be generated is free of any virus.
7 Related Work
The work presented here has been inspired by Viega, Bloch and Chandra’s work
on applying aspect-oriented programming to security [16]. They have developed
an aspect-oriented extension to the C programming language following also a
transformational approach, where aspects are defined independently of the main
application, and are then weaved into a single program at compilation time. Their
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let publish = replace GlobalProduct, ACCEPTINGx, GENERATEy
by PUBLISHED:GlobalProduct
if x ≥ MinApproval(k) ∧ y = NumMerges(k)
in
let accept = replace S: 〈VALIDATING:Product〉 , Log: 〈ω〉
by S: 〈VALIDATED〉 , ACCEPTING, Log: 〈ω, S:accept〉
if AgreeProduct(Product) ∧
SolutionRole(S, V alidator) ∧ RoleReaction(Editor, accept) ∧
TrustValue(S) > 0.5
in
let valid = replace S: 〈EDITED〉 , GlobalProduct, GENERATEy
by S: 〈VALIDATING:GlobalProduct〉 , GlobalProduct, GENERATEy
if y = NumMerges(k) ∧
SolutionRole(S, V alidator) ∧ RoleReaction(V alidator, valid)
in
let merge = replace S: 〈EDITING:Product〉 , GlobalProduct
by S: 〈EDITED〉 ,Merge(Product,GlobalProduct), GENERATE
if FinishProduct(Product) ∧
NoVirus(Product) ∧
SolutionRole(S,Editor) ∧ RoleReaction(Editor,merge)
in
let edit = replace S: 〈〉 , GlobalProduct
by S: 〈EDITING:GlobalProduct〉 , GlobalProduct
if SolutionRole(S,Editor) ∧ RoleReaction(Editor, edit)
in
let fail = replace S1: 〈ω〉
by S1backup : 〈ω〉
if Failure(S1)
in
let recover = replace S1backup : 〈ω〉
by S1: 〈ω〉
if Recover(S1)
in
〈S1: 〈〉 , · · · , Sk: 〈〉 , GlobalProduct, fail, recover, edit, merge, valid, accept, publish〉
Fig. 11. HOCL program for the VO system for product generation after weaving as-
pects
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emphasis is on security, developing aspects to replace insecure function calls by
secure ones. Our approach follows a transformational approach as proposed by
Viega, with the difference that the aspect definition is guided by the existence of
security patterns. Previous work on the application of aspect-oriented techniques
to chemical programming include [10, 11]. In [10], Mentre´ et al present the design
of shared-virtual-memory protocols using the Gamma formalism; then, aspect-
oriented techniques are used to translate this design into a concrete implementa-
tion, modelling cross-cutting concerns such as control and data representation.
Comparing with our work, they also used a transformational approach, weav-
ing at compilation time a Gamma program to produce an automaton; however,
they do not represent cross-cutting concerns as patterns. The work by Mousavi
et al [11] centred on extending Gamma with aspect-oriented concepts, including
aspects for timing and distribution. For each aspect, they present new syntac-
tic constructors and give them a structured operational semantics. The weaving
process map the different aspects into a common formal semantics domain based
on timed process algebra with relative intervals and delayable actions. Our work
has the advantage that there is not need of changing the underlying semantic
model (all our aspects are in HOCL) and exploiting the existence of composition
patterns.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
This paper has described an approach to program autonomic and secure Virtual
Organisations (VOs) when using the Higher-Order Chemical Language (HOCL).
Our approach is based on composition patterns and aspect-oriented techniques.
We represent aspects as a collection of transformation functions, each one mod-
elling a different cross-cutting concern. The functions are applied (weaved) to a
HOCL program in order to generate a new program that include the concerns.
Our working example has been a VO for the production of digital product,
and the cross-cutting concerns have been security properties such as attribute-
based authorisation and security logs, as well as autonomic properties such as
self-protection and self-healing. The approach comprises the following steps.
First, security requirements for the system under construction are defined. Sec-
ond, the requirements are modelled as transformational aspect functions follow-
ing a library of compositional patterns. Third, it is defined the join points where
the aspects functions should be applied. Finally, aspects are weaved producing
a new chemical program.
There are several avenues to follow as future work. Firstly, we are currently
studying the weaving of several aspects on the same reaction, analysing condi-
tions that guarantee properties such as commutativity and associativity of as-
pects. Secondly, we plan to investigate patterns for weaving aspects at run-time,
exploiting the high-order potentiality of HOCL. Thirdly, we are interested in
evaluating the effectiveness of our approach to improve modularisation of cross-
cutting concerns in HOCL; an initial step is to adapt quantitative methods to
evaluate AOP [8]. Finally, there are several similarities between chemical pro-
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gramming and other evolutionary approaches such as genetic programming [4];
we plan to investigate how our approach to secure and autonomic cooperations
can be applied when using genetic programming.
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